Prospects for Iraq: Some Lessons from History

Post-war occupations have had a mixed record. Successful operations require both commitment and time.

John Llewellyn, John Dew

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Foreword and Acknowledgements

A year ago, we presented figures that suggested, largely on the basis of UK experience in Northern Ireland, that the US-led coalition in Iraq had insufficient security forces at its disposal to restore, and then maintain, order and stability.[1]

One year later, and with the Coalition Provisional Authority about to hand over a measure of control to the Iraqis, this paper starts with that issue, this time examining a range of foreign occupations over the past fifty years. Drawing upon a range of historical sources and analyses, including importantly by RAND and by the US army, two conclusions stand out.

First, no post-WWII occupation of a country has been successful at a force ratio of less than 20 troops per thousand head of population. And indeed some occupations – most notably perhaps the French in Algeria – failed notwithstanding a force ratio of nearly 40. To try to bring order and stability to Iraq with a force ratio of just 6, therefore – and to Afghanistan with a force ratio under 1 – is to attempt something that has never been achieved.

Second, while order and stability are a necessary precursor of political, administrative, and economic reform, equally the belief that political, administrative and economic reform will be delivered is essential to achieving order and stability. People who do not believe that they are going to get the political reform that they desire will resist the occupying forces, often with considerable vigour. The challenge is to enter the virtuous, and not the vicious, circle.

In preparing this paper, a particular debt of gratitude is owed to:

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Christopher Tugendhat, of Lehman Brothers, who made important comments on various drafts, and who in particular stressed the importance of the Algerian war that, while not typically covered in English-language studies, carries important lessons.

All errors, however, remain the responsibility of the authors.

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[1] *Llewellyn, J., "*Costing the Peace*", Lehman Brothers Global Weekly Economic Monitor (28 March 2003) – reprinted in Appendix 1.*

Contents

Summary and Conclusions

The principal conclusions from this study are as follows:

1. Interrelationship between security operations and political progress. History, ranging from the wars in **Algeria** to **Malaya**, from **Bosnia** to **East Timor,** shows that order and stability are necessary preconditions for political, administrative, and economic reform: but without a realistic prospect of such reform, the occupied population will oppose the forces of order and stability.

2. **Numerical requirements of stability operations.** When there is any significant domestic opposition to an occupying power, restoring and maintaining order and stability typically requires a "force ratio" of 20 or more security personnel per thousand head of population. Examples include **Malaya**, **Northern Ireland**, **Bosnia**, and (with some qualifications) **Kosovo**. Other operations, in which the population saw little or no political hope – notably **Algeria** and **South Vietnam** – failed even with a force ratio of between 20 and 40. In **Iraq,** the troop force ratio is around 6.5, and in **Afghanistan** around 0.8. A troop force ratio for Iraq of around 20 would mean 500,000 troops, around three times the present level and, for Afghanistan, around 600,000 troops, over 25 times.

3. **The requisite pool of troops.** Modern professional militaries find that they need to limit tours of duty to about 6 months in every 30. A long-stay force of 500,000 for Iraq would thus require a pool of around 2.5 million soldiers – equal to the combined ground forces of the US, Turkey, Germany, France, the UK, and Italy. The numbers for **Afghanistan** would be similar, and additional.

4. **The cost of stability and control operations.** The cost of maintaining 500,000 security personnel would depend importantly on their country of origin. A 500,000-strong US force would have an all-up annual cost of around $120bn. A similar force from other G7 countries would probably cost around $50bn. A similar force containing 100,000 non-US personnel from G7 countries and 400,000 from emerging countries could have an all-up annual cost of around $11bn. Similar figures apply to **Afghanistan**.

5. **Duration of operations**. There is apparently no quick route to peacekeeping, even less to nation-building. British troops were 10 years in **Malaya**, and have been 35 years in **Northern Ireland**. Multinational forces have been 8 years in **Bosnia** and 4 years in **Kosovo,** so far. In **Iraq** and **Afghanistan**, 5 years could be the minimum to bring about order and stability, and 10 years to establish a self-sustaining political and economic system. However, these figures are only suggestive: it is unwise to set a timetable.

6. **The need for a multinational force.** Order and stability operations are not only more affordable, but also often more acceptable to the population, if undertaken as a diverse multinational peacekeeping operation. Multilateral command also makes it easier for a range of countries to contribute troops, even if it may complicate matters on the ground.

7. Political change. Military occupation alone cannot succeed if used as an alternative to the search for political solutions, or to impose a political solution on a hostile population. In **Algeria**, the French use of massive military force, while rejecting any form of political change, failed. In **Northern Ireland,** successive British governments failed to end the violence until they presented a political solution that all parties, including those who had supported or sympathised with the violence, could accept as a credible basis for negotiation. In **East Timor**, multilateral military intervention and UN administration provided the security necessary to achieve independence from Indonesia in 2002, for which nearly 80% of the population had voted.

In **Kosovo,** significant multilateral military intervention, and help with political, administrative, and economic reform, has so far failed to change the absolute determination of both sides to focus squarely on the issue of independence from Serbia. In **Bosnia**, a substantial international force and international political and economic aid, are still needed, nearly 10 years after the 1995 Dayton Agreement. The international community is heavily involved in political and economic reform, on both of which progress remains slow. **Bosnia** can however be seen as a moderate success for international intervention, if still costly and unfinished.

8. Civil administrative reform. Such reform can be crucial to the long-run viability of nation-building. Often requiring both the establishment of new institutions and education and training in running them, administrative reform can require a considerable input of experienced manpower from the mature democracies. And building up the requisite capability in sufficient strength can take many years. It is often more important that donor countries lend expertise than that they donate money.

9. Economic reform and assistance. Successful economic assistance often requires both aid and reform of economic policy and policy-making institutions. In **Bosnia** and **Kosovo**, external transfers were a massive quarter to half of the countries' GDP in the first two post-conflict years. Yet countries as diverse as **Germany**, **Japan**, and **Malaya** achieved impressive long-term economic performance with much less of a flying start.

10. Control and coordination. The achievement of order and stability, and thereafter the process of nation-building, is more complex as a multilateral effort than as a unilateral effort. However, a multilateral effort can be more acceptable to the occupied population, with the payoff that multilateral nation-building may more readily produce thoroughgoing transformations, and greater regional reconciliation.

11. Importance of a complete vision. To achieve a self-reinforcing circle between peacekeeping and nation-building requires success across a wide range of issues, and hence a clear vision of the totality of the exercise. That vision may evolve: certainly, it did in both **Germany** and **Japan**. But it needs to be clear to, and accepted by, the occupied population. Where the operation is multilateral, this implies the need also for agreement among, and commitment by, the partner countries. The Balkans model represents perhaps the most viable, if expensive and time-consuming, example to date.

12. Implications for Iraq and Afghanistan. A number of fundamental changes will probably have to be made to the strategy if there is to be a successful transition to democracy and sustained economic development. First, the requisite doubling or tripling of the number of security forces is possible only in the context of a multilateral effort: the US and the UK simply do not have the requisite numbers of troops. Meanwhile, in parallel, there is a need for a clear, credible, agreed, multilateral vision for the transition to democracy, backed up by effective administrative and economic reform. That would be expensive, but affordable. More important, it would take a major commitment in terms of the provision of human resources, and would take many years.

In **Iraq,** the conflicting political ambitions of the major groups, all well armed, and the lack of a functioning political, institutional, and economic infrastructure, point to a high risk of increased instability. Security, political development, and economic regeneration need to proceed in parallel. A large-scale and widely-supported multilateral involvement will need to underpin domestically-led efforts, perhaps for a decade.

In **Afghanistan,** the government still lacks the democratic validation of a free, well-organised election, postponed from June this year until September, mainly because of security problems. International troop numbers are too low to allow the government in Kabul to control the country, deal with warlords, enforce the rule of law and stop widespread heroin poppy cultivation. The Taliban are still active in some areas.

The unavoidable conclusion is that nation-building in Iraq will be messier, take longer, and cost more, than many assume. This in turn means increased, not decreased, budget outlays in the next several years, and a sustained high "risk premium" in financial markets. If the US is to continue to shoulder most of the cost, outlays for **Iraq** and **Afghanistan** together could rise from their present annual $100-120bn-odd to more than double that in the coming years.∎

Numerical Requirements Of Stability Operations

Force Ratios

The size of the stability force – military, paramilitary and police – necessary to restore and maintain order and stability in a country depends importantly on the size of the population being protected or controlled.[2] Hence, to normalise for differences in population size, troop or total security personnel numbers are often expressed as "force ratios" – the number of such personnel per thousand head of population.

A benchmark range

In intrinsically peaceful countries, such as the US and Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and so on, the "force ratio" – the number of security personnel (generally police, sometimes augmented by paramilitary forces) – is typically between 2 and 4 per thousand of population (Chart 1).

In some occupations, notably post-WWII **Germany** and **Japan**, order and stability was maintained by similar force ratios, but these were somewhat special cases: both countries had been thoroughly beaten in a bloody and protracted war, and their people were in no mind to resist. More recently, the United Nations operated in **Lebanon** and **Cambodia** at a force ratio of a little under 2, and in **Haiti** at a force ratio of 3.5, but in both cases, the aims were limited, stopping far short of full "nation-building."

The remainder of this section looks at the country-by-country evidence in some detail.

Chart 1.   **Benchmark Force Ratios – Peaceful Societies**
*Police officers per thousand head of population for the year 2000*

Sources: "Police Service Strength England and Wales", Home Office Online Report 23/03, (30 September 2002), taken from House of Commons Hansard Written Answers (28 March 2003) *http://www.johnmannmp.co.uk/Commons/2003-03-28%2001.html.*

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[2]   *This and the following section draw importantly, for Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, on Quinlivan, J. T., "Force requirements in Stability Operations", Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995) http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm and Dobbins, J., et. al., America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq" (RAND, 2003) and "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations" (RAND Review, Summer 2003) http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/burden.html).*

Troop Force Ratios Under 4

Germany and **Japan** after World War II were clearly special cases: both were large countries, and in the circumstances at the time large numbers of occupation troops were available. The more recent examples in this category are small countries.

West Germany

Year	1946
Population	46.2m
Area km²	244,820
No of troops	1,600,000+
Force ratio	35 → 2
Duration	To present
Success/Failure	Success

The occupation of **Germany,** following its unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945, was fundamentally different from all other post-war occupations. The entire German territory was occupied by foreign armies. In Western Germany, the US alone had some 1,600,000-odd troops, a troop force ratio of 34.6. Their orders were to "… spread out over every square mile of German territory and demonstrate without a doubt that they were in charge. US troops secured every road junction, bridge, border post, government building, factory, bank, warehouse; anything of the slightest conceivable importance had a guard of GIs around it, and so did a good many things of little or no importance, too."[3]

Cities and infrastructure had been largely reduced to rubble, and the capital stock of Western Germany had been reduced by a quarter. [4] The country was flooded with millions of refugees from the east, and large portions of the population were hungry and homeless. The German population, thoroughly demoralised, was in no mood to resist occupation.

The total breakdown of civil administration throughout the country required immediate measures to rebuild civil authority. After deposing Admiral Karl Dönitz, Hitler's successor as head of state, and his government, the Allies proclaimed on 5 June 1945, their supreme authority over German territory. The Allies were to govern Germany through four occupation zones, one for each of the Four Powers – the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.[5]

In the American Zone, army plans called for an occupation force of some 400,000 for the first 18 months. Very soon, however, the occupation shifted to a "police-type" operation. In the US zone, the United States Constabulary was formed in October 1945, and operated at a ratio of about 2.2 constables per thousand of population.[6] That force was sufficient to enforce public order, control black market activities, and carry out related police functions. Importantly, however, Germany's civilian administrative structures, including the police force, were substantially intact.

US forces remain in **Germany** to this day, more than 50 years after the end of World War II. However, geopolitical considerations are the principal reason: these forces play no role in the maintenance of domestic order and stability.

Japan

Year	1946-7
Population	84.1m
Area km²	377,835
No of troops	350,000
Force ratio	4
Duration	To present
Success/Failure	Success

In **Japan,** as in **Germany**, the economy had been devastated: 25% of national wealth had gone. All 66 mid-large cities had been destroyed, bar Kyoto. Transportation links were chaotic. Some 15-20% of the population was homeless. Neither the war-sick public nor the defeated military, much of which was still scattered across Asia from Manchuria to New Guinea, from Burma to New Britain, were in any mood to resist.

Unlike **Germany**, however, **Japan** was not invaded, and was occupied by foreign troops only when General MacArthur arrived, in August 1945. His advance party received a courteous reception from Japanese officials and troops. No one, whether inside or outside Japan, challenged the legitimacy of the occupation. Indeed, within Japan, according to the foremost US commentator on this period, there was not a single incidence of premeditated violence against the occupation.[7]

Around 315,000 US troops and approximately 45,000 British and Commonwealth troops occupied Japan. With the Japanese population at around 84m, this represented a force ratio of 4.2 per thousand of population.[8] But, in addition, the Japanese political and administrative architecture carried on essentially intact from top (Imperial system) to bottom (local government), and this included, importantly, the domestic police force.

3 Budiansky, S., "A Proven Formula For How Many Troops We Need", (Washington Post, 9 May 2004) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10161-2004May8.html
4 Kindleberger, C. P., "International Economics", p. 587 (Third edition, Richard D. Irwin, 1963).
5 See Library of Congress "Country Studies: Germany", http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/detoc.html.
6 See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.
7 Dower, J. W., "Embracing Defeat" (The New Press, 1999).
8 See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.

By July 1950, the Japanese had agreed to establish a 75,000-strong National Police Reserve, to function as a paramilitary force to fill the vacuum left by the movement of all but one division of US occupation forces to Korea.[9] The residual role of US forces was principally to provide oversight and surveillance.

US forces remain in Japan, as in Germany, to this day, more than 50 years after the end of World War II. However, again, geopolitical considerations are the principal reason.

Cambodia

Year	1992-93
Population	10.1m
Area km^2	181,040
No of troops	16,000
Force ratio	1.6
Duration	2 years
Success/Failure	Limited success

In **Cambodia** in August 1990, representatives of 18 countries, the four Cambodian parties, and the UN Secretary General, concluded a comprehensive settlement to end two decades of violent civil war that, in one of history's largest genocides and destructions of culture, killed an estimated 1.5m people,[10] 15% of the Cambodian population.

The follow-on October 1991 Paris Peace Agreements invested Cambodian sovereignty in a Supreme National Council (SNC), which delegated "all powers necessary" to implement the accords to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Its mandate included the supervision of the cease-fire, the repatriation of the displaced Khmer Rouge along the border with Thailand, the disarming and demobilisation of the factional armies, the supervision of about 60,000 indigenous police, and the preparation of the country for free and fair elections.

In early 1992, in what was then its largest-ever peacekeeping mission, the UN deployed, though UNTAC, a maximum of 15,591 troops, and 3,359 international civilian police.[11]

Given the population of approximately 10.1 million, this made for a troop force ratio of about 1.6, and a total force ratio of 1.9, per thousand of population.[12]

This was a reasonably successful operation, within its limited terms of reference. Its greatest successes have been taken to be that an election was duly held, in May 1993; least successful was the failure to bring discipline to the indigenous police force.[13]

This was, however, only a limited operation: the UN had no presence outside the large population centres, and neither did it have the capacity to control or protect the combatant factions or the civilian population. Specifically, it did not enter Khmer Rouge-controlled territory, and so never brought order and stability to the country as a whole. That would have been impossible with the limited number of troops at its disposal.

UNTAC's mission lasted just 17 months: the last of the international forces left Cambodia in September 1993.

Lebanon

Year	1982-84
Population	3.1m
Area km^2	10,400
No of troops	6,000
Force ratio	1.8
Duration	2 years
Success/Failure	Failure

In June 1982, Israel invaded **Lebanon** to remove PLO forces that had been attacking Israel. The United States brokered an agreement for the evacuation of Syrian troops and PLO fighters from Beirut, and provided for the deployment of a three-nation Multinational Force during the period of the evacuation. US, French and Italian units stayed in Beirut from August to September, supervising a successful evacuation. So far, so good. The multinational force had delivered a clear objective.

However, stability rapidly broke down, Israeli forces entered West Beirut, and Lebanese militias massacred Palestinian refugees. Multinational troops rapidly returned to **Lebanon**. At its peak, the force totalled approximately 5,600, made up of around 1,800 US Marines, 2,200 Italians, 1,500 French, and 100 British.[14]

With the population in Lebanon at the time approximately 3.1m, this represented a troop force ratio of 1.8.

This force was initially successful in helping to stabilise the situation. Lebanon, Israel, and the United States signed an agreement on Israeli withdrawal that was conditional on the

[9] "Dobbins, J., et. al., "America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq" p. 35.(RAND, 2003)
[10] Wipedia notes that the United States Department of State, Amnesty International, and the Yale Cambodian Genocide Project, estimate the total death toll as 1.2 million, 1.4 million and 1.7 million respectively, and concludes that an estimate of 1.5 million (from a total population of about 7 million in 1975) seems a reasonable consensus. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khmer_Rouge.
[11] UNTAC "Facts and Figures", http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacfacts.html.
[12] See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.
[13] Ledgerwood, J. L., "UN Peacekeeping Missions: the Lessons from Cambodia", Analysis from the East-West Center No 11 (March 1994).
[14] See "Cedar South Lebanon" http://www.veteranen.info/~cedarsouthlebanon/mnf/multinational_force.eng.htm).

departure of Syrian troops, but which Syria repudiated. Stalemate ensued, violence increased, and the multinational troops, essentially a token force with a vague mission, were too few to be able to influence events. The force increasingly came under fire. In October 1983, 298 US and French servicemen were killed in a single suicide attack. US and other international troops withdrew in early 1984.[15]

Somalia

Year	1992-95
Population	6.1 m
Area km^2	637,657
No of troops	16,000
Force ratio	2.6
Duration	3 years
Success/Failure	Failure

The UN Operation in **Somalia** (UNOSOM I) in 1992 was established to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, provide protection and security for UN personnel and equipment, and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies. This operation consisted of 50 unarmed military observers and 500 lightly armed infantry. However, the situation in Mogadishu continued to deteriorate. In December 1992, a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 794) authorised the deployment of a US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF). This included 28,000 troops, authorised to use decisive force if necessary, whose primary mission was to safeguard the relief effort.

With a population of just over 6 million people, this represented a troop force ratio of 4.6 per thousand of population.[16]

In 1993, pursuant to UNSCR 814, responsibility passed from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It had an authorised strength of 28,000, but in practice never numbered more than 16,000. US forces withdrew from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Although UNOSOM II continued for a while, the last forces departed in March 1995. The country soon reverted to the violence and chaos that had prevailed before the US and UN operations.[17]

Haiti

Year	1995-96
Population	6.5m
Area km^2	27,750
No of troops	23,000
Force ratio	3.5
Duration	2 years
Success/Failure	Short term success

In **Haiti** in 1991, democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in a violent coup in which 3,000 - 5,000 Haitians were killed, provoking a large-scale exodus of boat people. In 1994, the UN Security Council authorised member states to use all necessary means to restore Haiti's constitutionally elected government.

In 1994, US forces entered under the terms of a request from President Aristide, an agreement with the *de facto* government of Raul Cedras that had seized power, and a United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) authorising the use of "all means necessary" to restore the democratically elected government.

American forces entered unopposed on 19 September 1994, and a total of 23,000 troops from 28 nations participated in "Operation Uphold Democracy" and formed the Multinational Force (MNF).

There were no indigenous police, so given the population of 6.5 million, this represented both a troop force ratio and a total force ratio of around 3.5 per thousand of population.[18]

There was only a handful of violent incidents. Foreign troops left after 17 months,[19] and on 31 March 1995 responsibility for security passed from the MNF to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). A democratic election was held in December 1995, producing Haiti's first ever transition from one democratically elected president to another. But political deadlock ensued. The government was unable to organise the local and parliamentary elections due in late 1998. They were finally held in 2000, but fierce controversy over alleged fraud led to the collapse of the government. In February 2001, Aristide was sworn in as the new President.

Recently, the situation has deteriorated again, and foreign forces – US, French, Canadian, and Chilean – have returned. These countries currently have around 3,800 troops in Haiti. A UN force, planned to consist of some 6,700 troops, is to take over from 1 June 2004.[20]

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[15] See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/usmnf.htm.
[16] See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.
[17] Dobbins, J., et. al., "America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq", pp. 55-62 (RAND, 2003)
[18] See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.
[19] Benson, K. C. M., and C. B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations", Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly (Autumn 1996 http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96autumn/benson.htm.
[20] Garamone, J., "Stability Returns to Haiti, Force Plans for Successors", US Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/n04272004_200404273.html.

Troop Force Ratios Between 4 And 10

In the majority of occupations, however, occupation forces have operated at significantly higher force ratios. In two instances, the **Punjab** region of **India** (1992) and the **Dominican Republic** (1965), operations were undertaken at force ratios of between 4 and 10 security personnel per thousand of population.

India (Punjab region)

Year	1992
Population	20.2m
Area km²	50,362
No of troops	115,000
Force ratio	5.7
Duration	1 year
Success/Failure	Success

India deployed a security force in the **Punjab** region in 1992 to combat Sikh assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings directed at Indian officials and facilities, other Sikhs, and Hindus over nearly a decade, in pursuit of an independent Sikh state called Khalistan.

The Indian security forces were deployed at a total force ratio (troops, paramilitaries, and police) of around 5.7 per thousand of population.[21] [22]

The frequency of the attacks dropped markedly from mid-1992, as Indian security forces killed or captured a host of senior Sikh militant leaders. The overwhelming majority of Sikhs in the Punjab region, where they constitute some two thirds of the population, have rejected terrorist violence and participate fully in Indian democratic politics.

Total civilian deaths in the Punjab region have reportedly declined more than 95% since their peak when more than 3,300 civilians died in 1991. This very significant reduction results largely from Indian security force successes against extremist groups

Dominican Republic

Year	1965
Population	3.8m
Area km²	48,730
No of troops	24,000
Force ratio	6.3
Duration	1 year
Success/Failure	Success

In the **Dominican Republic** in 1965, the United States intervened in the civil war to separate the protagonists, to secure Santo Domingo, and to restore and maintain order and stability. The number of US soldiers and Marines totalled 20,000 at the peak.[23]

Given the population of approximately 3.8m, this implied a troop force ratio of 6.3 per thousand of population.[24]

The Organisation of American States soon took over responsibility for the force from the US, and several Latin American countries provided troops. All troops were withdrawn in less than a year.

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[21] *See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.*
[22] *See Quinlivan, J. T., "Force requirements in Stability Operations", Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995) http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm, who in turn cites an interview with Punjab's Director General of Police, Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, in Jane's Defence Weekly p. 23 (23 January, 1993).*
[23] *Library of Congress, "Country Studies: Dominican Republic" http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+do0024. Note that Quinlivan gives a somewhat higher figure, 24,000, for the US maximum troop deployment: see Quinlivan, J. T., "Force requirements in Stability Operations", Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995) http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm.*
[24] *See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.*

Afghanistan 1979 to 1989

Year	1979-89
Population	15.1m
Area km²	647,500
No of troops	115,000
Force ratio	7.6
Duration	10 years
Success/Failure	Failure

The Soviet Union invaded **Afghanistan** in December 1979 at the request of a Marxist government that had provoked widespread revolt by seeking to impose a sweeping secular reform programme (including full rights for women) underpinned by fierce repression of dissent, including summary executions. Armed opposition to the invasion quickly developed, led by diverse groups called "mujahideen". Their efforts eventually forced the Soviet Union to withdraw in early 1989, undefeated but unable to control the country and after suffering serious continual losses. The mujahideen received significant support in terms of equipment from the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia, and China, mainly channelled via Pakistan. They were also helped by thousands of Muslim radicals from other Islamic countries, including Osama bin Laden.

The Soviet Union built up its occupation force to some 115,000 troops (on top of the Afghan army, which it is estimated shrank from some 80,000 in 1978 to 25,000 by the end of 1980).

With the population at the time an estimated 15.1m, this represented a troop force ratio of 7.6.

One million Afghans are believed to have died, mostly from air attacks on villages, and an estimated five million refugees left the country. Notwithstanding massive superiority in firepower, the Soviet forces were unable to defeat the mujahideen guerrillas, who were able to evade large-scale offensives against them. The Soviet forces were routinely ambushed when they moved by road, and the mujahideen were eventually able to counter Soviet airpower with hand-held anti-aircraft missiles supplied by the US. By 1982, the mujahideen were in control of 75% of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops after negotiations in Geneva in 1988, involving Pakistan, and conducted under UN supervision. The Marxist government in Kabul struggled on, fighting the mujahideen until the city was captured by the so-called Northern Alliance in April 1992. A number of mujahideen commanders established themselves as local warlords. Others reacted against them and supported the Taliban, who took control of the country in 1996.[25]

East Timor

Year	1999-2002
Population	85,000
Area km²	15,007
No of troops	6,000
Force ratio	7.4
Duration	3 years
Success/Failure	Success

East Timor declared itself independent of Portugal in November 1975. Nine days later, it was invaded and occupied by Indonesia and, in July 1976, it was incorporated into Indonesia. A campaign of pacification followed over the next two decades, during which an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 people were killed. On 30 August 1999, in a UN-supervised popular referendum, the people of East Timor voted for independence.

In the days following the election, pro-Indonesian militias continued to kidnap, murder, and force the evacuation of local residents. The UN reported that up to a third of the population was forced out of the region.

On 12 September 1999, Indonesia's President Habibie announced that Indonesia would accept a UN peacekeeping force for East Timor. "Operation Warden" began with the arrival of the first troops on 20 September 1999, and met with no resistance from militias or the Indonesian military. The force, led by Australia, consisted of troops from Australia, Britain, Thailand, and several other countries, including 200 US troops who provided communications and logistical support. The total force of 7,687 uniformed personnel was made up of 6,281 troops, 1,288 civilian police, and 118 military observers; UNTAET was accompanied by 737 international civilian personnel and 1,745 local civilian staff.[26]

With an estimated population of 847,000, this represented a troop force ratio of 7.4 and a total force ratio of 8.9.

On 25 October 1999, the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was established to administer the Territory, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition period, and support capacity-building for self-government.

[25] This section draws particularly on: Northern Virginia Community College gateway to learning on the world wide web, http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Afghanistan79.htm, Association of Teachers' Websites, www.historylearningsite.co.uk/afghanistan.htm, and Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1023.htm
[26] "UN Peacekeeping" http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetBC.htm.

On 20 May 2002, East Timor was internationally recognized as an independent state, ending 25 years of Indonesian occupation of East Timor, and thereby becoming the world's newest democracy.[27]

Force Ratios Between 10 And 40

When significant sections of the population are hostile to the authorities seeking to restore and maintain order and stability, even higher force ratios, ranging up to nearly 40 per thousand of population, have proved necessary. This has been the case in operations as diverse as **Northern Ireland** (1979 - present), **Malaya** (1948-60), **Bosnia** (1996-97), **Kosovo** (2000-01), **South Vietnam** (1955-75), and **Algeria** (1954-62).

Northern Ireland

Year	1970s
Population	1.52m
Area km²	14,160
No of troops	26,000
Force ratio	19.2
Duration	35 years
Success/Failure	Eventual success

The **Northern Ireland** situation is something of a special case, in that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and has, throughout the troubles and indeed long before, had a fully functioning civil society, including an effective police force. At the peak of the troubles in the 1970s, the United Kingdom government deployed 17,000 troops,[28] who operated together with the Ulster Defence Regiment (8,700)[29] and police from the Royal Ulster Constabulary (3,500).[30]

Given a population of 1.52 million, this represented a troop force ratio of 16.9, and an overall security force ratio of about 19.2 per thousand of population.[31]

The number of troops has now, after 35 years, been reduced significantly, to around 13,000, the lowest level since 1970.[32] With the total number of regular police officers now around 8,744,[33] and a population of around 1.69m,[34] this makes for a current troop force ratio of 7.6, and an overall security force ratio of 12.8.

Malaya

Year	1948-60
Population	5.5m
Area km²	329,750 Malaysia
No of troops	40,000
Force ratio	20
Duration	12 years
Success/Failure	Success

The **Malayan** "Emergency" from 1948 to 1960 was an insurrection and guerrilla war in which the Malay Races Liberation Army (MRLA), a creation of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), led and dominated by ethnic Chinese communists, opposed the British plan for a Malayan Federation. This was a difficult war in rugged, jungle-covered terrain.[35]

The British followed a multi-faceted strategy, ranging from fighting the guerrillas on the one hand to preparing the Malay people for independence on the other. Up to 40,000 British and Commonwealth troops were deployed, together with over 70,000 regulars of the Malay Regiment.

With a population at the time of 5.5m, this implied a troop force ratio of around 20 per thousand of population.[36]

Progress was made towards self-government and, in 1957, Malaya became independent, under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. This removed the rationale for the insurgents' anti-colonial war of liberation and, ultimately, stability and control was established and maintained. Only in July 1960 was the Malayan government able to declare the Emergency over.

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[27] "CIA "FactBook: East Timor" http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tt.html.
[28] UK Army Headquarters in Northern Ireland: History http://www.army.mod.uk/aishqni/history/.
[29] UK Army Headquarters in Northern Ireland: History http://www.army.mod.uk/aishqni/history/.
[30] The true number is probably a little higher. This figure is taken from the CAIN Web Service, which notes in "Security and Defense" that "Up until March 1970 the size of the RUC never exceeded 3,500 members, but this was reassessed in the light of 'the Troubles', and membership of the RUC stood at 8,489 when it was replaced by the PSNI" [in 2001].http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security.htm.
[31] See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.
[32] Northern Ireland Office statement "Responding to a changing security situation- the government's approach" October 2003 http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/respchang2003.pdf.
[33] The Report of the Chief Constable of Northern Ireland 2002-2003 states that the effective strength (i.e. excluding officers on secondment and those who have not yet graduated) was 6,940 regulars, with 1,804 full-time Reserve officers: see Orde, H., , "About the PSNI", Report of the Chief Constable 2002-2003, Police Service of Northern Ireland http://www.psni.police.uk/reportofchiefconstable.pdf.
[34] Whittaker's Almanack 1999, p. 112 (The Stationery Office, 1998).
[35] See Simpson, J. G., "Not by Bombs Alone: Lessons from Malaya http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1622.pdf.
[36] See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.

Bosnia

Year	1996
Population	3.25m
Area km²	51,129
No of troops	60,000
Force ratio	23
Duration	8 years so far
Success/Failure	Qualified success

In **Bosnia** in 1995-96, a NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) served to implement the 21 November 1995 Dayton peace agreement. IFOR operated initially with 60,000 troops.[37]

Given an estimated population of 3.25 million, this represented a troop force ratio of around 18.5 per thousand of population.[38]

It took 8 months to take the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to full strength, and ultimately the IPTF succeeded in training 16,000 police officers,[39] taking the total force ratio to around 23.4.[40]

That force ratio did not provide complete order and stability, however. Neither the military nor the civil authorities performed various security-related tasks, such as riot control, and combating organised crime: the military because it lacked the mandate, and the civil because it lacked the capacity.[41]

The operation began with the intention that it would last just a year. However, international forces have been present in **Bosnia** for the past 8 years, IFOR having been succeeded by a smaller NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). At end-2002, there were still approximately 12,000 SFOR troops present.[42]

Troop Force Ratios Above 20

Kosovo, **South Vietnam** and **Algeria** present three very different examples of high force ratios, but each in the context of an intractable political situation.

Kosovo

Year	1999
Population	1.90m
Area km²	10,908
No of troops	45,000
Force ratio	26
Duration	4 years so far
Success/Failure	Partial success, so far

Belgrade's rejection of a diplomatic settlement reached in Rambouillet (France), to stop the increasingly violent civil war, finally triggered military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). On 3 June 1999, after 11 weeks of increasingly intense NATO bombing, and facing the prospect of a Western military intervention on the ground, Yugoslav President Milosevic accepted NATO's conditions. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, passed on 10 June 1999, prescribed arrangements for **Kosovo's** post-conflict governance, establishing a UN-led international administration, and authorising the deployment of a NATO-led military security force. The initial units of the UN Kosovo Peace Implementation Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999, and numbered almost 45,000 by the end of that year.

Given the estimated population of 1.90 million, this represented a troop force ratio of around 26 per thousand of population.[43]

NATO and the UN shared the responsibility for post-conflict order and stability: the UN had primary responsibility for the police and law-and-order functions, while NATO filled gaps in the UN's capabilities. Disarmament proceeded slowly, and was never total, but by September 1999, the KFOR commander certified that demilitarisation had been adequately completed.

The UN effort to create a multinational police force took many months to become fully established but, by December 2000, 4,450 United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) international police were in the province. UNMIK also moved to create and begin training a new local police force, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).

By August 2001, KFOR's total presence in the province had dropped to 38,820. The UNMIK CIVPOL contingent however remains significant: as of 2003 there were some 3,700 international police in **Kosovo**, and 5,700 Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in the

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[37] CIA FactBook: Bosnia Herzegovina http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html.
[38] See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources. Quinlivan, however, states that the initial troop force ratio was "more than 20": "Quinlivan, J. T., Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations" (RAND Review, Summer 2003 http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/burden.html. Some uncertainty attaches to the population figure (see Appendix 3 to Table 1). Including the civilian police force takes the total force ratio to 19 or more.
[39] Dobbins, J., et. al. "America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq" pp. 97-8. (RAND, 2003)
[40] See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.
[41] Dobbins, J., et. al.," America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq" (RAND, 2003) pp. 114.
[42] CIA FactBook: Bosnia Herzegovina http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html.
[43] See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.

Kosovo Police Service.[44] The crime rate, initially high, has been dropping as the UNMIK and KPS police efforts have matured. The police force does not, however, yet meet the standards generally achieved in Western Europe.

The intervention was never expected to be short. Five years after they first arrived, foreign security forces are still in **Kosovo**, as much needed as ever. In February 2004, there were 18,000 NATO troops, and a further 2,000 were sent in March 2004 after outbreaks of severe violence that showed that, despite substantial international financial assistance and sponsorship of economic reform, the political problems are more intractable, and lasting solutions further off, than many had hoped.

There are now some 3,735 international police in **Kosovo**, and 5,704 Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in the Kosovo Police Service. This represents a troop force ratio of around 11, and an overall security force ratio of about 15. The political future is uncertain, even if the security situation is for the moment under control, and the original problem of Serbian aggression that led to military intervention by the international community has been dealt with.

South Vietnam

Year	1955-75
Population	18.0m
Area km^2	171,716
No of troops	524,000
Force ratio	29
Duration	20 years
Success/Failure	Failure

US military involvement in the war in Indochina started in 1955, with the sending in of 100 special advisers to **South Vietnam**. The US presence built up progressively to a peak of more than 524,000 troops in 1969.[45]

With the population of **South Vietnam** numbering around 18m, this represented a troop force ratio of approximately 29 per thousand of population, without taking into account the South Vietnamese police.[46]

Even at this force ratio, it proved impossible to impose order and stability in a situation where there was significant domestic hostility, and large-scale infiltration of insurgents from North Vietnam and neighbouring countries.

The US presence lasted for 20 years, ending with departure in 1975.

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[44] *UN, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council (January 2004).*
[45] *"Vietnam War", Britannica http://www.search.eb.com/elections/micro/623/9.html.*
[46] *See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.*

Algeria

Year	1954 - 62
Population	10.9m
Area	2,381,740
No of troops	400,000
Force ratio	37
Duration	8 years
Success/Failure	Failure

In **Algeria**, as in **Northern Ireland**, the war was not strictly a case of recent invasion by a foreign occupier: France had been in Algeria since 1834. But unrest started to come to a head towards the end of 1954, in what developed into a difficult and bitter war, involving a number of factions. The Muslim nationalist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was in rebellion against France. At the same time, there were civil wars between extremists in the Muslim and the European communities, and between the "ultras" or "colon" extremists (the immigrant population and their descendants, the so-called pieds-noirs) and the French government in Algiers. The war was also taken to mainland France, where over 500 people were killed in the so-called "café wars". By 1956 France had 400,000 troops (half of its total armed forces) in Algeria, together with units of the navy and the air force.[47]

With the population numbering around 10.9m[48], this represented a troop force ratio of approximately 36.6 per thousand of population, without taking into account the police force.[49]

Even at this high force ratio, France was unable to control the country. Brutality and torture by the French troops led to a loss of France's moral authority, and strong criticism by its NATO allies. Eight years after the start of the war, on 1 July 1962, some 6m of a total Algerian electorate of 6.5m cast a near-unanimous vote in a referendum on independence. On 3 July 1962, President Charles de Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country.

Table 1.   **Peak Force Ratios in Major Stability and Control Operations**

Country episode	Date	Troops (Thousand)	Paramilitaries and Police (Thousand)	Population (Million)	Peak Force ratio Troops	Total
Germany, West	1945	400	-	46.19	8.7	-
Japan	1946-47	350	-	84.10	4.2	-
Malaya	1948-60	40	71.1	5.51	7.3	20.2
Algeria	1954-62	400	-	10.9	36.6	-
South Vietnam	1955-75	524	-	18.00	29.1	-
Dominican Republic	1965	24	0.0	3.80	6.3	6.3
Northern Ireland	1970s-present	26	3.5	1.52	16.9	19.2
Afghanistan	1979-89	115	-	15.10	7.6	-
Lebanon	1982-84	6	-	3.09	1.8	-
Cambodia	1992-93	16	3.4	10.07	1.6	1.9
India, Punjab region	1992	← 115 →		20.20	-	5.7
Somalia	1992-95	16	0.0	6.06	2.6	2.6
Haiti	1995-96	23	0	6.50	3.5	3.5
Bosnia	1996-present	60	16	3.25	18.5	23.4
East Timor	1999-2002	6	1.3	0.85	7.4	8.9
Kosovo	2000-present	45	4.5	1.90	23.7	26.1
Afghanistan	Present	23	-	28.51	0.8	-
Iraq	Present	157	2.9	25.37	6.2	6.3

Sources and methods: See Appendix 3.

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[47] Library of Congress: Country Studies: Algeria http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/dztoc.html.
[48] Lahmeyer, J., "Algeria: Historical Demographical Data of the Whole Country", University of Utrecht http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Africa/algeriac.htm.
[49] See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.

The Requisite Pool of Troops

Tour Length, Deployment Intervals, And The "Rule Of Five"

Post World War II experience, with stabilisation forces made up largely of professional armies in which soldiers remain in service for years at a time, has been that tours of duty have to be kept to around 6 months.

In **Vietnam**, operational tours of American soldiers and Marines were for 12 months or so. More recently, however, Western governments have been unwilling or unable to impose such protracted tours. In **Northern Ireland**, the British limit the tour of duty for most troops to about 6 months. The continental European countries and the United States also generally aim to conduct intervention operations in spells of 6 months or shorter. Moreover, the 6-month tour has become standard in most peace-keeping deployments, for example in **Bosnia** and **Kosovo**.

Only a fraction of the potentially available troops can be deployed at any given time: the rest are preparing for deployment, recovering, or retraining. Professional militaries, where soldiers remain in service for years at a time, try to keep the interval between deployments at 24 months or more.

Thus, to the extent that a 6-month tour of duty and a 24-month interval are achieved, troops are on an operational tour only 6 months in every thirty. This means that five troops are required for every soldier deployed in the theatre of operations. If a stabilization effort cannot adhere to this so-called "rule of five," then either the deployment time has to be extended beyond 6 months, or the interval between deployments reduced below 24 months, with a consequent loss of troop morale.

Duration Of Operations

There have been only a limited number of genuine nation-building operations, and these lasted many years: British troops were 10 years in **Malaya**, and so far have been 35 years in **Northern Ireland**, while multinational forces have so far been 8 years in **Bosnia** and 4 years in **Kosovo**.

Political, Administrative, And Economic Reform

A primary motive of many post-World War II operations to restore and maintain order and stability has been to effect a transition to democracy. The record has been mixed, with success or failure being determined in significant part by the success or failure in transforming its institutions – political, administrative, and economic. The section below examines the scale of reform that was undertaken in a range of the post-WWII occupations.

Political Reform

Planning for the administration of post-war **Germany** began in the UK as early as the middle of 1940, fully five years before the eventual end of the war. And by the time that US and British troops joined those of the Soviet Union in Berlin in the summer of 1945, the allies had already acquired considerable experience in administering other newly liberated territories. The introduction of democratic political parties was one of the primary concerns of the Allies during the final phase of the war. Local elections were held just under three years after the fall of Hitler. National elections followed 18 months later, once the new Federal Republic of Germany had been created from the Western occupation zones.

Democracy came before economic revival: the basic political reforms were in place by 1947; but neither currency stabilisation nor the Marshall Plan was instituted until 1948, and economic recovery did not really start until 1949.[50]

In **Japan**, the political system was changed fundamentally by the US occupation force. Under a new constitution, the emperor became a "symbol" of the nation rather than the head of state. Military forces were permanently banned, although a "self-defence force" was created in the early 1950s. Women were given voting rights, land reform (considered further below) was implemented; and elections were introduced for members of the upper house, the House of Councillors. These changes were carried out amid trials of war criminals, food shortages, hyperinflation followed by fiscal restraint, and political struggles between the right and left.[51] As in Germany, political reform came before economic reform: per capita income in Japan did not exceed pre-World War II levels until after the economic boost afforded by U.S. purchases of material for the Korean War in 1951 and 1952.

In **Malaya**, the success of the British campaign against Communist insurgents from 1948 until 1960 allowed the move to independence in 1957 as the Federation of Malaya. The Federation was stable enough to incorporate the Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak in 1963, when it changed its name to the Federation of Malaysia, and to withstand both the withdrawal of Singapore (originally a member of the Federation) in 1965, and hostile armed incursions across the border from Indonesia in the early 1960s (overcome with the help of the British army). Both **Malaysia** and **Singapore** have remained stable democracies, and have flourished economically, in large part through adopting open, market-based economic policies.

In **Bosnia**, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) managed all election activities until 2001. The US administration, having originally set a one-year deadline for the Bosnia mission, pressed successfully for early and frequent elections at each level of government. In most cases, the elections returned the nationalist parties that had helped spark the civil war, and strengthened those resisting the creation of a democratic and multi-ethnic state. Over time, however, candidates suspected of having committed war crimes, and of attempting to obstruct the implementation of the Dayton peace process, were barred. Following the adoption of an election law in August 2001, and the appointment of the Electoral Commission in November 2001, direct administration of the election process was handed over to the national authorities.[52]

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[50] *This section draws inter alia on Hobsbaum, E., "The Age of Extremes" (Abacus, 1994), and Marsh, D., "The Bundesbank" (Heinemann, 1992).*

[51] *This section draws on Dower, J., "Embracing Defeat" (The New Press, 1999), Ito, T., "The Japanese Economy" (MIT Press, 1992), Kennedy, P., "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" (Unwin Hyman, 1988), Large, S. S., "Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan, a Political Biography" (Routledge, 1992), and Takafusa, N., "A History of Shōwa Japan, 1926-89", translated by Wen Mouth, E. (University of Tokyo Press, 1998).*

[52] *Dobbins, J., et. al. "America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq" pp. 103 and 106 (RAND, 2003).*

General elections for the Cantonal Governments, entity Governments, the State Government, and the State level tripartite Presidency took place in **Bosnia** in October 2002. The elections were well organised, passed off without violence, and broadly met international standards. These elections were particularly significant as the first organised solely by the Bosnian authorities since Dayton. The turnout, at 54%, was lower than expected, showing some disillusionment with the slow pace of the reform of the previous "Alliance for Change" coalition, elected in November 2000. The current government, made up predominantly of the three main nationalist parties, has agreed (in partnership with the international community) to reform of the economy, rule of law, education, defence, and public administration over the next two years. Progress has however been slow.

Somalia remains possibly the only country in the world without a functioning government, and has been divided by warring factions for nearly a decade, although in January 2004, at peace talks in Kenya, warlords and politicians signed a deal to set up a new parliament. Prospects remain uncertain, however.

In the **Dominican Republic** in June 1966, Joaquin Balaguer, leader of the Reformist Party, was elected President, and re-elected in 1970 and 1974, both times after the major opposition parties withdrew late in the campaign. Although defeated in 1978 (the country's first peaceful transfer of power), Balaguer was re-elected in 1986, 1990 and 1994. The Dominican Republic remains a stable, if imperfect, democracy.

In **Haiti**, although economic sanctions and US-led military intervention forced a return to constitutional government in 1994, the underlying situation changed little, with allegations of electoral irregularities, continuing extra-judicial killings, torture, and brutality.

Meanwhile, Haiti's most serious social problem, the wealth gap between the impoverished Creole-speaking black majority and the French-speaking mulattos, 1% of whom own nearly half the country's wealth, remains unaddressed. Furthermore, the country's infrastructure has almost completely collapsed, and drug trafficking has corrupted both the judicial system and the police force.

In **East Timor,** Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao was directly elected by the people as first president In April 2002, and on May 20, 2002, East Timor gained independence. A modern constitution had been produced by a drafting assembly that in turn became a parliament, thereby creating the preconditions for a sovereign state.

Given the presence of the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET), security has remained relatively stable. The relationship with Indonesia continues to be positive; public administration is developing; the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation continues to provide a community-based solution for less serious crimes committed in connection with the political conflict; and responsibility for policing is progressively being assumed by the national police force.

Nevertheless, East Timor faces an uncertain future. Nation-building, economic reconstruction and consolidation of democratic government remain key challenges. The UN has agreed to maintain a reduced peacekeeping, policing and government administration presence until mid-2004, and discussions are underway at the UN on a possible extension of UNMISET (in a reduced form) until May 2005.[53]

In **Kosovo**, municipal elections were held in October 2000, and a parliament elected in November 2001. In February 2002, the Kosovan parliament elected Ibrahim Rugova as President after ethnic Albanian parties reached a power-sharing deal. The principal problem has been the intractability of the relationship between Serbian and Albanian Kosovars. The latter make up some 90% of the population, and are adamant that the only stable future for Kosovo is as an independent country. This is vigorously opposed by the Serbian population, and by Serbia itself. The Albanian Kosovars regard resolution of Kosovo's "final status" as by far the most pressing question.

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[53] *Information on East Timor drawn from the EU Presidency statement on the situation in East Timor, 10 May 2004 http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/7a0a3350528c235085256e920052236d?OpenDocument, the East Timor Office of the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung http://www.kas.de/proj/home/home/68/2/, and the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, South and South East Asia Division, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/sea/countrypapers/timorlestepaper.html.*

The drafters of UN Security Council (UNSCR) Resolution 1244 considered that any attempt to determine Kosovo's final status would only destabilise the larger region, while most neighbouring countries strongly opposed this. However, the international community has achieved some important successes: it has promoted a democratic transformation in Belgrade; worked out an accommodation between Serbia and Montenegro; defused a civil conflict in Macedonia; continued to build multi-ethnic institutions in Bosnia; and begun the integration of the region into both NATO and the EU.[54]

These benefits have come, however, at the cost of political stagnation. It is an issue on which no agreement between Albanian and Serb Kosovars is remotely possible at present or, it now appears, at any foreseeable future date.

Civil Administrative Reform

In **Germany**, the Allies agreed that the country should never again have the opportunity to destroy European peace as it had in the two world wars. As a first step toward demilitarising, denazifying, and democratising Germany, the Allies established a joint international military tribunal in August 1945 to try individuals considered responsible for the outbreak of the war and for crimes committed by the Hitler regime.

The Allies sought not merely to punish the leadership of the National Socialist regime, but to purge all elements of National Socialism from public life through a denazification process that also dealt with lower-level personnel connected with the Nazi regime. Their pasts were reviewed to determine whether the parts they had played in the regime warranted their exclusion from the new Germany's politics or government. Germans with experience in government, and not involved in the Nazi regime, were needed to cooperate with occupation authorities in the administration of the zones.

The intensity of the process of denazification differed in the four zones. The most elaborate procedures were instituted in the US zone, where investigated individuals were required to complete detailed questionnaires concerning their personal histories and to appear at hearings before panels of German adjudicators. In the British and French zones, denazification was pursued with less vigour, because the authorities judged it more important to reestablish a functioning bureaucracy in their sectors.

Over time, however, prosecution became less severe, as the United States became more concerned with the Cold War. Denazification ended in March 1948.[55]

In **Japan,** the purge of the bureaucracy went less deep than in Germany. The severe lack of Americans who could speak Japanese led the occupation forces to retain the existing bureaucracy, after purging it of approximately 210,000 Japanese who had been in leadership positions in designated organisations.

These included wartime cabinet ministers and other high officials; the Special High Police; governors of occupied territories, members of the ultra-rightist Military Virtue Society, and officials of the Imperial Rule Assistance Society, an umbrella organisation that had been created during the war to unite all political forces behind the emperor.

General MacArthur's staff peaked at only 3,500 or so, in 1948. That staff had wide powers, and succeeded in a range of administrative reforms.

The police system was thoroughly reorganised. The Special Higher Police, which had been responsible for enforcing restrictions on speech and thought, were dissolved in 1945. The police were banned from interfering in labour affairs. The Home Ministry, which had directed an extensive network of repressive police forces, was abolished in 1947, and the police were reorganised as a decentralised force.[56]

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[54] Dobbins, J., et. al. "America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq" pp. 122-3. (RAND, 2003).
[55] This section draws inter alia on Hobsbaum, E., "The Age of Extremes" (Abacus, 1994), and Marsh, D., "The Bundesbank" (Heinemann, 1992).
[56] This section draws on Dower, J., "Embracing Defeat" (The New Press, 1999), Ito, T., "The Japanese Economy" (MIT Press, 1992), Kennedy, P., "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" (Unwin Hyman, 1988), Large, S. S., "Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan, a Political Biography" (Routledge, 1992), and Takafusa, N., "A History of Shōwa Japan, 1926-89", translated by Wen Mouth, E. (University of Tokyo Press, 1998).

In **Bosnia,** civil administrative reform was disjointed, in large part because of poor coordination resulting from a US-European split over the implementation of the Dayton accord. Most European countries wanted the EU to have responsibility for the entire civilian effort, but the US did not want a European pillar competing with NATO for authority. From the outset, civilian implementation lagged the military effort. Progressively, the civilian administration improved, and important lessons were learned, which were put into effect in Kosovo. [57]

In **Kosovo**, in contrast to **Bosnia**, the military forces (NATO) and the civilian authorities (led by the UN) had an appropriate mandate that set them up to cooperate well. It took many months to draft in foreign personnel to establish an administrative presence. By 22 November 1999, however, there were 1,169 personnel from the UN and partner organisations in Kosovo. By the end of 1999, UNMIK had established a series of interim administrative structures for governing the province.

Economic Reform

To a large extent, the process of economic reform has been one of converting economies to, or towards, a market-based system. In some cases, the effort made was considerable, and the reforms far-reaching: in others, little effort was made, and reform was minimal.

Thus in **Haiti,** there has been little or no economic reform, and economic performance has been dismal. About 80% of the population still lives in poverty. Nearly 70% of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector, which consists mainly of small-scale subsistence farming. Similarly, **Somalia** and the **Dominican Republic** have undergone little or no economic reform, and remain among the world's poorest countries.

By contrast, a diverse range of countries, from **Germany** and **Japan** to **Bosnia** and **Kosovo,** have undergone major economic reform, and experienced a considerable – and often very considerable – economic payoff.

In **Germany,** US Treasury Secretary Morganthau had wartime plans to turn Germany into a "pastoral economy" – no more industry. Because of growing tensions with the Soviet Union, however, these plans did not last. Nevertheless, economic recovery was slow in coming. In the winter of 1946-7, industrial production fell to a level last seen in the nineteenth century. The Bank deutscher Länder, the precursor of the Bundesbank, was set up a year before the creation of the Federal Republic in 1948. In June, the reichsmark was replaced by the deutschemark, the currency was stabilised, price controls were removed, and hoarded stocks came on to the market. Recovery followed.

Even in its defeated state, the Federal Republic still possessed remnants of its substantial infrastructure, and had large internal resources, from coal to machine tool plants. Furthermore, its people were highly educated and disciplined. The emerging need to develop the Federal Republic as a bulwark against communism led to German big business picking up by the late 1940s, while the banks were encouraged to play a central role in the direction of industry. Although West Germany did not become a full member of the Marshall Plan until 1949, the Plan played an important role in the nation's renaissance. Germany received just over a tenth (the fourth largest share of the total) of US disbursements to Western Europe of $13.3bn (about $100bn at today's prices).

The years 1948 to 1952 were the period of fastest growth in European history. Industrial production increased by 35%. In Germany industrial production rose by 110%, and real GNP by 67%. [58]

In **Japan** in the initial phase of the occupation, General MacArthur focussed his economic reform efforts on the democratisation of economic opportunity, to provide the bulk of the population an economic stake in the nation that it had previously lacked. There were three principal elements. The first involved the large business combines (*zaibatsu*) that, it was considered, had suppressed domestic consumption with low wages and, in their quest for

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[57] Dobbins, J., et. al., "America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq", (RAND, 2003) and "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations" pp. 100-103 (RAND Review, Summer 2003).
[58] This section draws inter alia on Hobsbaum, E., "The Age of Extremes" (Abacus, 1994), and Marsh, D., "The Bundesbank" (Heinemann, 1992).

cheap raw materials and foreign markets, had supported overseas aggression. In the end, 83 *zaibatsu* were broken up, and antimonopoly laws passed to prevent them from reforming; but their financial links remained intact.

The second element in Japan's economic reform was the enactment of laws that gave labour the right to reorganise. And the third major element was land reform, designed to reduce the political and economic power of the landlords. As a result, the proportion of owner-operated land rose from 54% in 1947 to 90% in 1950. The share of farmers who owned their own land rose from 38% to 70% over the same period.

In **Malaya**, the British encouraged both Malaysia and Singapore to engage in the open-economy model, and both did so, to considerable, even spectacular, effect.

In **Bosnia**, efforts to establish new economic institutions and policies were slow to get underway and, largely because of acrimonious inter-ethnic politics and the weak constitutional authority of the national government, progress has continued to be slow. Only after the signing of the Dayton peace accord was a governor appointed to the new central bank, and it began operations only a year later, at which time a currency board was introduced. Progressively, new tax codes were introduced (although an important weakness was that high customs duties encouraged smuggling, which in turn financed much organised crime); a modern payment system was introduced; and a number of free-trade agreements were concluded with regional trade partners. Progress with privatisation, however, has been slow.

Public expenditure is excessive, and revenue collection inadequate. Capital inflows from the international community are dropping off. Domestic and international investment is low, in part deterred by a bureaucratic regulatory framework.

In **Kosovo**, GDP had decreased by an estimated 50%-odd in the decade before the conflict, largely because of Yugoslavia's involvement in wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and its poor economic policies. **Kosovo** began, and ended, the decade as the poorest region in the former Yugoslavia.

The EU, which had the lead responsibility for economic reconstruction of **Kosovo**, drew on the expertise of donor countries and international financial institutions to manage the reconstruction and economic development effort. This involved a number of tasks, most of which were pursued simultaneously: the creation of the Central Fiscal Authority, a nascent finance ministry; a new tax system and tax administration; a new international-trade regime and customs department; the creation of the Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo (BPAK); the legalisation of the use of foreign currencies for domestic transactions; the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure; a new commercial code; and a new criminal and civil code. By January 2003, Kosovo had a budget and a functioning finance ministry. Tax revenues covered over 90% of current expenditures in 2002 and are expected to cover 100% in 2004. The financial system is solid, BPAK is considered competent and budgetary practice matches international standards.[59]

Political stagnation, however, has frustrated hopes for economic reform and development led by United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Kosovo is now suffering from economic stagnation, made worse by falling levels of international economic support.

Economic Assistance

Economic assistance – direct or indirect – can play a vital role in promoting economic recovery. For example, after the end of World War II, Japan's economy was in a shambles, and its international economic relations were almost completely disrupted. Initially, imports were limited to essential food and raw materials, mostly financed by economic assistance from the United States. Because of extreme domestic shortages, exports did not begin to recover until the Korean War (1950-53), when special procurement by United States armed forces created a boom in indigenous industries. By 1954, economic recovery and rehabilitation were essentially complete.

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[59] *Dobbins, J., et. al., "America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq", (RAND, 2003) and "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations" (RAND Review, Summer 2003 pp. 123-5. (op. cit).*

In Europe, US Marshall Plan aid was crucial in permitting economic recovery to get under way without being brought to a premature end by balance of payments problems. In 1947, Europe's current account deficit of $7bn, equivalent to about 5% of its GDP, was financed largely by grants and loans from the US.[60]

At the same time, however, no amount of economic aid can overcome poor domestic economic policies. The post-war history of development aid is replete with examples of countries that, for one reason or another, have absorbed large amounts of aid, yet failed to get on to a path of self-sustaining economic development and growth.

In **Bosnia**, the recovery was propelled by a $5.1bn foreign-assistance package between 1996 and 1999, and economic growth was very rapid in the years immediately following the Dayton peace accord.

In **Kosovo**, international assistance has been on a greater (proportionate) scale than in any post-conflict response before or since. The US and the international organisations provided $1.5bn of financial assistance to **Kosovo** in 1999 and 2000, and expatriates and friends another $350m. This aid, which amounts to approximately one thousand dollars per inhabitant, has raised living standards considerably above where they would have been otherwise.

Aid cannot permanently sustain a country's standard of living, however, and the long-term evolution of living standards will depend, as always, on a complex of factors but which amount, at root, to market-friendly economic policies.

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[60] *Llewellyn, G. E. J., "Competitiveness and the Current Account" in Boltho, A., "The European Economy" p. 135 (Oxford University Press, 1982).*

The Importance Of A Complete Vision

It is truism, but an important one, that any successful stability and control operation has to be founded on a clear, coherent, and practical vision of what it is trying to achieve. Although it was a relatively small episode, a cogent example of the problems that can arise from the lack of a clear vision is the US-led multinational intervention in Lebanon from 25 August 1982 to 26 February 1984.

By contrast, the much more important cases of **Germany** and **Japan** turned out to be success stories, and it is tempting to conclude – and it often is – that a major part of the reason must have been a clear and feasible vision on the part of the allies, most notably the United States. In reality, however, matters were not as straightforward as that. The initial visions for **Germany** and **Japan** both underwent considerable, even fundamental, change, given the realities of the cold war that followed rapidly on the heels of the Second World War. In both cases, the initial vision was changed, and quite fundamentally, when the international situation put a premium on growth and economic progress as a bulwark against communism. That said, the evolving vision was a realistic one.

In **Japan**, initial policy blueprints explicitly emphasised that the occupation forces bore no responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or strengthening of economy. Indeed, as late as 1945 the US was intent on exporting much of Japan's remaining capital stock to countries that had suffered from Japanese aggression. In essence, policy largely echoed Morganthau's designs for a "pastoral Germany."

The focus on key reforms in unionisation, women's rights, the liberalisation of education, legal and land reform and the democratisation of the economy (anti-trust measures) were dominant in 1945-47.

Policy changed with regard to the economy when domestic support for the domestic communist and socialist parties greatly exceeded US expectations, and as Soviet control over Eastern Europe became clear, the Chinese civil war kicked off, and communist progress in Indonesia and the Philippines gathered momentum. The loss of China in 1949 added to the pressure for change, and the Korean War took it to another level. Indeed, Korea made Japan a subordinate cold-war partner.

George Kennan, the adviser to the US Secretary of State who oversaw the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe, came to Japan in autumn 1947 and encouraged the shift towards reconstruction and the revival of the economy. The initial focus was on boosting iron and steel output, but this was followed by a strategy of de-control, the opening up of trade, and the stabilisation of the currency by means of tight monetary and fiscal policy and a fixed exchange rate.

Similarly, in establishing the Marshall Plan for Europe in 1947 and 1948, the US not only had a clear analysis of what was holding Europe's economies back from recovery, and risking their going communist, but also a clear – if somewhat belated – vision of what they had to do to put the European economies on to a self-sustaining path of economic recovery.

The diagnosis was that if one European country put on a growth spurt, its surging imports provoked a balance of payments crisis that in turn obliged it to stop its growth. Yet each country's imports were another country's exports, so that growth never got going Europe-wide. If, however, all the European countries were to grow simultaneously, the US explained, none would have a major trade imbalance with any other. And, to the extent that Europe as a whole had a trade deficit with the rest of the world (principally the United States), the US agreed to pay for it. In the event, the US paid for about one-quarter of Europe's total imports of goods and services, or almost two-thirds of its merchandise imports from the dollar area, from 1947 to 1950.

More important for the long-term sustainability of the European economic recovery, however, was that, under predominantly US pressure, the European countries progressively dismantled tariff barriers, and started to trade more freely not only amongst themselves, but also with the rest of the world. By the end of 1949, approximately half of

intra-European trade had been freed from quantitative restrictions, and by 1956 some 90% was free.[61]

Thus the dominant economic power of the time, the United States, not only developed a clear vision, but one that was analytically well founded. And, as Europe steadily grew in prosperity, that fact became progressively more widely recognised.

This task of giving effect to a realistic post-war was complicated enough even in the 1940s, but at least then the United States was in a dominant military, economic, and intellectual position. The US not only had the only intact major economy: it was also the largest economy, by far. And not only its economic aid, but above all its economic and political leadership, were recognised and accepted, all the more so because the US was willing to back up its vision with hard cash.

Today, however, matters are more complicated than they were in the 1940s. The United States economy, while still the world's largest, is not as dominant as once it was. Indeed, the EU economy, to the extent that it can be considered as a single economy, is now, following the accession of the latest ten countries, some 10% bigger than that of the US. And Japan is 40% the size. Furthermore, while the United States has by far the technologically most sophisticated armed forces, it does not have the largest army: that of China is over 2.5 times as large, and that of India 1.7 times. US technological superiority, crucially important in the combat phase, is less relevant in the post-combat, stability and control, phase. Numbers on the ground are equally, probably more, important.

All this means that, when it is seeking to impose stability and control on a medium-sized country such as **Afghanistan** or **Iraq**, the United States has both a strong economic and political interest – indeed a need – to involve other countries. This is progressively being realised. **Afghanistan** (estimated population 28.5m) and **Iraq** (estimated population 25.4m) are not small. Attaining the requisite force ratio, and providing economic and technical assistance on the level required to produce a good chance of subsequent political, administrative, and economic success, requires contributions from a number of major countries. The largest economies are those of the G7 – the US, Japan, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Canada – that together produce about 80% of the world's total output of goods and services. By contrast, the countries with the largest armed forces, in addition to the US, China, India, the two Koreas, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey (see Table 2).

Hence the US needs to cooperate with two quite diverse groups of countries – one on economic matters, the other where large numbers of troops are required. Yet these diverse countries do not share a common political, administrative, or economic vision. And this in turn makes the process of coordination and control much more difficult than it used to be, when a single country alone could realistically seek to give effect to its own vision. That is the focus of the next section.

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[61] Llewellyn, G. E. J., "Competitiveness and the Current Account" in Boltho, A., "The European Economy" p. 135 (Oxford University Press, 1982).

Control And Coordination

The issue of control and coordination is always present in military occupations, though its precise form differs from case to case. And successful nation-building, which requires the harnessing of a wide range of activities and resources, in turn requires the implementation of a coherent overall vision or plan.

Coordination is challenging enough when only one country is involved: it is even more complicated when a number of countries are involved.

Salient points from the more important occupations include the following.

In post-war **Germany**, the US had to cooperate not only with France and the UK but, most importantly, with a recalcitrant Soviet Union. While cooperation between the US, France, and the UK was difficult on occasions, nevertheless there was broad agreement on a democratic, market-economy vision for **Germany**, and on the basic ways in which to give effect to it. By contrast, the Soviet Union saw a communist future for itself and beyond, so that the problem that the US, the UK, and France had with cooperating with it were so intractable as to result in the partitioning of Germany into western and eastern parts – part of the process that led to, and epitomised, the Cold War that was to last for 40 years.

In **Japan**, by contrast, the US was largely on its own, as was the UK in **Malaya**. In both cases the outcome was a broad success: in each there evolved a realistic and credible vision of what was to be achieved, with (internal) problems of control and coordination no more serious than was to be expected.

In **Somalia** and **Haiti**, the United States experimented with sequential arrangements whereby it organised, led, and largely manned and funded, the initial phase of the operation, but then turned responsibility over to a broad UN force. These efforts were not successful, although the operation in **Haiti** was better organized than that in **Somalia**. In **Bosnia**, unity of command and broad participation on the military side were achieved through the agency of NATO, but less progress was made on the civil side.

In **Kosovo**, unity of command and broad participation on both the military and civil sides was achieved through the agency of NATO and the UN, respectively. While the military and civil aspects of that operation remained under different management, the mandates and capabilities of the two entities – Kosovo Peace Implementation Force (KFOR) and United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) – overlapped and prevented a gap from opening up between them. NATO support for the civilian policing operation was key – akin to the support that the British forces provided for the Royal Ulster Constabulary in **Northern Ireland**.

The intractable nature of the underlying political problems does not invalidate the effectiveness of the Kosovan, and to some extent the Bosnian, models for managing a large-scale nation-building operation. These have depended heavily on the ability of the international community to reach agreement on objectives, and on the response of the relevant institutions, such as NATO, the EU, and the UN, to those common objectives

More recently, in **Afghanistan**, the United States has opted for two separate military command structures, and even greater variety on the civil side. An international force with no U.S. participation operates in Kabul, while a coalition – but mostly US – force operates elsewhere. The UN is responsible for promoting political transformation, while individual donors try to coordinate economic reconstruction. This arrangement is a marginal improvement on **Somalia**, but **Afghanistan** represents a clear regression from what was achieved in **Haiti**, **Bosnia**, and **Kosovo**. However, it is much less advanced than the efforts in **Bosnia** or **Kosovo** at a similar stage.

In **Iraq,** control and coordination were in one sense well established immediately after the war, with the deposition of Saddam Hussein by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Coalition-appointed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). But the CPA did not control US military forces in Iraq. The problems have been more in establishing satisfactory coordination between departments and agencies in Washington. The period since the end of the war against Saddam Hussein has been characterised by a series of policy changes, as the difficulties of charting a way forward through Iraq's complex political landscape have become increasingly apparent. The CPA, the IGC, and the US and UK governments appear to have been repeatedly taken by surprise by developments, to an extent that suggests that control and coordination have been weaker than the circumstances require.

Implications For Iraq And Afghanistan

Introduction

The history of post-WWII occupations as reviewed in the previous sections suggests that there are at least two necessary conditions for success in effecting a transition to democracy.

First, there is a need for a sufficiently large, well-conducted military operation, backed up by adequate police or paramilitary resources, to bring about and thereafter maintain order and stability.

Second, and in parallel, is the need to demonstrate a credible intention to effect a transition to an acceptable political outcome. This typically involves a range of political reforms, supported by a range of administrative and economic reforms.

This section considers first the likely size, and hence the potential cost, of the requisite stability force. It then surveys the range of political, administrative, and economic reforms that would have to be undertaken in parallel.

The Size And Cost Of The Requisite Stability Force

Iraq

Post-World War II experience is that in no case where significant parts of the population have been hostile to the occupying power has a foreign force brought about order and stability with a force ratio below 20, the ratio in situations as diverse as **Malaya**, **Northern Ireland, Bosnia,** and **Kosovo**. Furthermore, depending upon the strength and determination of the opposition, it has in important cases proved impossible – notably **Algeria** and **South Vietnam** – to achieve order and stability even with a force ratio approaching 30 or even 40.

Technology can help, by making the occupying force more efficient but, in contrast to the combat phase, there seems to be no substitute for sheer numbers.

The population of **Iraq** today is around 25 million.[62] A force ratio of 20 (troops, paramilitaries, and policemen) per thousand of population, quite possibly the minimum necessary to provide a reasonable chance of success, would require 500,000 security personnel.

At present, there are around 135,000 US troops, 7,500 British troops, and around 14,300 troops from other countries, making a total of 157,000,[63] a troop force ratio of around 6.5 per thousand of population.[64]

The effective size of Iraq's own security forces is a matter of judgement. In principle, the Iraqi Police Service currently numbers around 73,000, and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps around 33,000.[65] However, few of these are adequately trained. It has been stated, for example, that by early in May 2004, only half of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps remained at their posts.[66] The number of "academy-trained" Iraqis in the Iraqi Police Service was only of the order of 2,900 in April 2004.[67] Without further training and recruitment, Iraq's own security forces will not be able to make a significant constructive contribution for some years.

On the basis of such numbers, **Iraq** probably currently has around 160,000 effective security personnel. This is only one-third that implied by a force ratio of 20.

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[62] *CIA World FactBook – Iraq http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html.*
[63] *Reuters, 26 April 2004.*
[64] *See Table 1 and Appendix 3 for details and sources.*
[65] *Figure taken from the independent think-tank, GlobalSecurity.org,*
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/images/040412-status.gif.
[66] *Ratnesar, R., and P. Q. Judge, "Can Iraqis Do the Job? (Factiva, 3 May 2004*
http//:global.factiva.com/en/arch/print_results.asp.
[67] *Figure taken from the independent think-tank, GlobalSecurity.org,*
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/images/040412-status.gif.

On the face of it, therefore, the Coalition lacks sufficient security personnel in **Iraq** to have a reasonable change of achieving and maintaining order and stability in the face of even moderate opposition from insurgents.

It can be argued that the true force ratio in **Iraq** is higher than 20, because, for example, the Kurds in the north of Iraq are not resisting the occupation forces, who are thereby left free to concentrate, in a markedly higher force ratio, on the troublesome parts, most notably the so-called "Sunni triangle" in central Iraq. However, that argument is misleading, because it could equally well be applied to regions such as **Northern Ireland**. There, too, the bulk of the population was quiescent, with trouble concentrated in certain key areas. But the force ratio of 20, which was required for many years, applied to the region as a whole, with the actual ratio in the hot spots correspondingly much higher.

The "Rule of Five," whereby a modern professional army can keep its troops in the theatre of operations only for about 6 months in every 30, implies that keeping 500,000 troops in **Iraq** would require a troop base of 2.5 million. This is about the size of the combined ground (army) forces of for example, the US (659), Turkey (402), Germany (191), France (137), the UK (117), and Italy (116) (Table 2).

Table 2.   25 Largest armed forces and 25 largest economies

	Armed Forces				
	Total	**of which, army**	**Estimated Reservists**	**Paramilitary**	**GDP**
Country	**(000)**	**(000)**	**(000)**	**(000)**	**($ million)**
China	2,270	1,700	550	1,500	48,380
United States	1,414	6,591	1,259	53	329,616
India	1,298	1,100	535	1,090	13,073
Korea, North	1,082	950	4,700	189	4,728
Russia	988	321	2,400	409	48,040
Korea, South	686	560	4,500	5	12,615
Pakistan	620	550	513	289	2,541
Iran	520	350	350	40	4,865
Turkey	515	402	379	150	8,727
Vietnam	484	412	3,000	40	2,286
Myanmar	444	350	n.a.	100	2,837
Egypt	443	320	254	330	3,121
Taiwan	370	200	1,657	27	7,479
Syria	319	215	354	108	1,819
Thailand	306	190	200	113	1,730
Ukraine	302	148	1,000	113	4,728
Indonesia	297	230	400	195	6,245
Germany	296	191	390	n.a.	31,465
Brazil	288	189	1,115	386	9,651
France	260	137	100	101	38,005
Ethiopia	253	160	n.a.	n.a.	442
Japan	240	148	47	12	37,070
Italy	217	116	65	254	24,210
United Kingdom	210	117	257	n.a.	35,249
Saudi Arabia	200	75	n.a.	16	20,981

1. Includes Marine Corps.
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance: 2003•2004" (2003). The figures should be regarded as indicative only. They include troops of differing quality, and give no indication about different degrees of combat readiness or availability for deployment. GDP data are from Datastream.

Cost

Calculations of the true cost of war and of peacekeeping are fraught with difficulty. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between "budgetary" and "economic" cost.

Budgetary cost. The straight wage and salary cost of US soldiers in **Iraq** is probably around $40,000 per soldier per year.[68] To this figure must be added, however, all the other costs associated with peacekeeping, including food, accommodation, ammunition, transport, accelerated wear and tear on equipment, and the periodic rotation of occupation personnel and equipment. These additional costs are considerable. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) works with an all-up cost for recent peacekeeping operations, for example in **Bosnia** and **Kosovo**, of $240,000 per US soldier per year[69] – although the costs seem to be working out higher in Iraq. The costs of UK peacekeeping operations – and, by implication, of other European peacekeeping forces – while substantial, are somewhat less than half that, being estimated at between £50,000 and £75,000 (mid point about $100,000) per soldier per year.[70]

Economic cost. To the extent that, had these soldiers not been in **Iraq** or **Afghanistan**, they would have been in military employment somewhere else in the world, and that at least their basic wages and salaries would have been paid in any event, the "budgetary cost" figures overstate the "economic" cost. The true, or "economic," cost of peacekeeping operations arguably should be calculated as the extra, or marginal, costs of having the armed forces carry out their peacekeeping duties, rather than those that they would have carried out otherwise, together with resulting lost private sector output. These figures would need to include, importantly, the extra cost incurred through calling up reservists. In normal times, reservists are paid what is in effect a retainer: when they are called up to active service, however, they are paid a full salary.

In practice, however, it is difficult to disentangle those expenditures that have been incurred as a result of the troops being in **Iraq** and **Afghanistan** from those that would have been incurred had they not been.

One potential way of calculating the true "economic" cost of US peacekeeping activities is to take the supplemental amounts that have been voted by Congress. However, it is at present impossible to disentangle the money that was voted for reconstruction from that which was voted to cover pure extra troop costs. On the face of it, it seems that around $125bn may end up having been voted for **Iraq** and **Afghanistan**, taken together, for 2004, with the great bulk of the expenditure being in and on Iraq.[71]

On this basis, the present true, or "economic," cost of US operations in **Iraq** and **Afghanistan** is already around 1% of US GDP, with the great bulk of the expenditure being in Iraq. For the purposes of calibration, this compares with a cost of:

- Around 2% of GDP on average for the two peak years of the Vietnam War.[72] One of the reasons that the peacekeeping operations in Iraq, which involve 135,000 soldiers, are so expensive relative to the US military operations in South Vietnam, which involved over 500,000 troops at the peak, is that the US forces in South Vietnam were largely low-paid draftees, whereas those in Iraq are professional soldiers; and

- A little under 3% of GDP for the tax cuts enacted to date.[73]

Any estimate of what 500,000 security personnel would cost depends importantly on which countries provide the troops.

In sharp contrast with the $40,000 US wage and salary cost figure cited above, the average salary cost (including hazardous-duty pay) of a high-grade sergeant in the new Iraqi army

[68] *Lehman Brothers estimate from US Department of Defense information in monthly rates of basic pay and special pay – duty subject to hostile fire or imminent danger http://www.defenselink.mil).*
[69] *In Congressional Budget Office, "Estimated Costs of a Potential Conflict with Iraq", (September 2002) ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/38xx/doc3822/09-30-Iraq.pdf), the CBO "used an average cost for a U.S. army peacekeeper consistent with experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo. On that basis, it put the cost of 200,000 army peacekeepers at $4bn per month, i.e. $240,000 per soldier per year.*
[70] *Estimate provided by Col. Christopher Langton of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.*
[71] *This figure includes up to $60bn in expenditures during 2004 from the proposed $87bn in additional funding for the war. It also includes: $31bn in expenditures in 2004 from the supplemental funding for the war that was enacted in April 2003; $3bn in 2004 expenditures from the $10bn "defence contingency" funding enacted as part of the Omnibus 2003 Appropriations Bill in February 2003; and $8bn in 2004 expenditures from the supplemental funding enacted immediately after 11 September 2001.*
[72] *Nordhaus, W. D., "The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq" (NBER Working Paper No. w9361 December 2002) put the 'size of the defense buildup' in the Vietnam War from 1965:3 to 1967:1 as 1.9% of GDP, and cites in turn the US Department of Commerce, National Income and Product accounts.*
[73] *Kogan, R., "Sacrifice is Relative: Cost of War, Though High, Remains Far Less than Cost of Tax Cuts", Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (11 September, 2003) http://www.cbpp.org/9-11-03bud2.htm.*

is around \$1,200 per year, and the cost of a mid-grade lieutenant colonel is about \$2,400.[74] Thus the average, \$1,800 per Iraqi soldier per year, is less than a twentieth of the cost of a US soldier.

Hence, a long-stay stability force of 500,000 personnel could cost the following:

- If composed entirely of US troops – although this is not feasible, given that the total strength of the US army is around 659,000 [75] – the all-up cost would be of the order of \$120bn.[76]

- If composed of European peacekeeping soldiers, the all-up cost would probably be somewhat less than half that, at around \$50bn per year. [77]

- If composed entirely of personnel from developing countries, the all-up cost might be say \$6bn[78], one twentieth of the \$120bn cost of an entirely US force. And in practice the cost could well be lower than that, because it would not be necessary to pay for certain costs, such as rotation.

- If, as would seem most credible for success, a stability force were to be composed of say 100,000 non-US personnel from G7 countries, and 400,000 other personnel, mainly from **Iraq** but perhaps from some other developing countries also, the all-up cost could be of the order of \$11bn. [79]

Afghanistan

The number of foreign troops in **Afghanistan** is currently around 23,000. The US has 17,000 troops in the country, and the 18-country International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by the United Kingdom, which currently provides 1,700 troops, consists of some 6,000 troops in total.[80, 81]

With the estimated population of **Afghanistan** today a little under 30 million,[82] this represents a troop force ratio of under 1 per thousand of population, or less than one twentieth of the number of security personnel that history suggests would be the minimum necessary to achieve order and stability in the country as a whole.

US troops, by far the largest element in the international military presence, are concerned mainly with operations against Taliban and Al-Qaeda remnants, not the stability or good government of Afghanistan itself. The Afghan government is able to exercise little effective control over much of the country outside Kabul, and has to tolerate a number of regional warlords. Elections originally due in June of this year have had to be postponed, due to the security situation, and because administrative arrangements for a vote were behind schedule. According to the UK charity Christian Aid, only 1.5 million of the 10.5 million people eligible to vote had been registered by March 2004.[83] A UK parliamentary Committee that has recently visited Afghanistan is expected to present a report in July criticising the lack of international troops and resources available to provide essential security.[84]

Given the estimated population of Afghanistan of 28.5m people,[85] a force ratio of 20 would imply the presence 570,000 troops – approximately the same as requited in Iraq. The costs of that force could be expected to be similar also. And the "Rule of Five" would require that that force be drawn from a pool of around 3 million security forces – in addition to the pool required for **Iraq**.

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[74] Congressional Budget Office, "Paying for Iraq's Reconstruction" (January 2004) ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/49xx/doc4983/01-23-Iraq.pdf.
[75] See Table 2.
[76] 500,000 x \$240,000 = \$120bn.
[77] 500,000 x \$100,000 =\$50bn.
[78] On the basis of the two Iraqi wage and salary figures quoted (average \$1800 per soldier per year), and on the assumption that the other costs too were in proportion to the ratio of US to Iraqi wage costs.
[79] [(100,000 x \$100,000) + (400,000 x(\$1,800)] = \$11bn.
[80] Foreign and Commonwealth Office: "Global Issues: International security: Afghanistan" http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1033062383055.
[81] Gilmore, G. J., "Afghanistan Efforts Paying Off, DoD Official Tells House Committee", US Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/n04292004_200404297.html).
[82] See Appendix 3 for details.
[83] See http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/afghanistan.
[84] "The Independent," 25 May 2004.
[85] See Table 1.

Economic Assistance

Conceptually, there are two major categories of expenditure, in addition to those of funding order and stability, that will need to be financed in **Iraq** and **Afghanistan**. The first is the one-off cost of reconstructing Iraq's infrastructure. The second is the recurrent cost of the government's operations.

Reconstruction costs

The most comprehensive estimate to date of the total cost of reconstructing Iraq's infrastructure has been made by the United Nations and the World Bank in their joint *Iraq Needs Assessment*. This study makes a distinction between "immediate needs" for 2004, which it puts at around $17.5bn, and "medium-term priorities" for 2005 through 2007, which it puts at $37.7bn, for a grand total of around $55bn. [86]

The United States has voted to provide more than $18bn in grants to assist that reconstruction, and other countries and organizations have pledged a similar amount, mostly in the form of loans.[87] All together, projected and pledged amounts approach at least the lower end of Iraq's projected needs.

Recurrent costs

The Congressional Budget Office has projected the recurrent cost of financing the future Iraqi government's operating expenses at around $12-13bn per year, and payments on Iraq's international debt and claims stemming from Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait at around $1bn per year.

Iraqi oil exports should be able to cover all of these expenditures, and possibly, depending on the prevailing price of internationally traded oil, with some revenue left over. In January 2004, Iraq was producing about 2.1 million barrels per day (mbd), and exporting around 1.6 mbd of that. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) hopes to maintain exports at about that rate this year, and increase them thereafter, to reach 2.5 mbd by 2006. The CPA does not intend to privatise the oil sector so, at an oil price of around $31 per barrel – the present average future price for this year and next – oil export revenues accruing to the CPA can be expected to be of the order of $18bn this year, rising to perhaps $28bn by 2006.

This would leave a net surplus of revenue over operating expenditure, this year and next, of the order of $4bn per year. This is significantly greater than the estimates published in January 2003 by the Congressional Budget Office, which, on the basis of an assumed oil price of $21 per barrel, yielded only a small (less than $1bn) projected surplus.[87]

The Importance Of A Complete Vision

It is evident that so far, no complete, credible vision for political, administrative, and economic reform has been communicated to, let alone accepted by, the Iraqi people. At the same time, it is worth recognising that the initial visions in both **Germany** and **Japan** were far from appropriate, and underwent quite fundamental change during the years of occupation. While the Coalition can therefore be faulted for its initial lack of an appropriate vision and overall plan, it would not be inconsistent with past experience were it ultimately to produce a workable plan for self-sustaining democracy administration, and economic development.

Conclusions

In **Iraq:**

- Significantly more – quite possibly three times more – foreign troops are likely to be needed than the 160,000 that are there at present. It will take some years to build up Iraq's own security forces.

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[86] United Nations/World Bank, "Joint Iraq Needs Assessment", (October 2003) http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/ mena.nsf/Attachments/Iraq+Joint+Needs+Assessment/$File/Joint+Needs+Assessment.pdf.
[87] Congressional Budget Office, "Paying for Iraq's Reconstruction" (January 2004), ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/49xx/doc4983/01-23-Iraq.pdf.

- The requisite pool of 500,000-odd troops for Iraq would have to be drawn from a pool of approximately 2.5 million soldiers.

- The presence of foreign security forces is likely to be required for at least five years, assuming that political and economic development proceed successfully, and progress is made in building an effective domestic police force and army. Progressively, the prevention of crime should be taken over by the police, with the principal role of the army moving to the protection of the police.

- Multilateral command would make it easier for a wide range of countries to contribute troops, even if the United States remained an important contributor. This is an important consideration, given that the numbers of troops likely to be needed, especially if they are to be rotated frequently enough to enable such numbers to be sustained for the length of time needed, will be beyond the effective military capacity of any narrow group of countries, including the US.

- Multilateral command, even though difficult to effect, would be likely to be more politically acceptable to the majority of Iraqis than would a continuation of US and UK command.

- To be accepted in Iraq, and to achieve results that will in time permit its orderly withdrawal, the military presence will need to be seen to be motivated by a genuine and credible desire to help Iraq determine its own future, including training Iraq's own army and police.

- Given the potentially conflicting political ambitions of the major groups, such a process will need strong multilateral guidance and support, to provide a secure framework within which major differences can be reconciled.

- While five years is likely to be the minimum period to achieve and demonstrably maintain order and stability, a full transition to democracy, effective civil administration, and self-sustaining economic growth could well take ten years or more.

- While economic assistance can be important in alleviating bottlenecks that might otherwise slow or halt economic growth, money is unlikely to be the most pressing issue. More important is likely to be Iraq's need for assistance from skilled manpower from the G7 countries and beyond.

- Perhaps the two most telling cases in the context of present-day Iraq are **Algeria** (pessimistic) and **Kosovo** (more optimistic, within limits).

Algeria showed that even the highest-ever force ratio, of nearly 40 security forces per thousand of population, cannot produce order and stability when a large proportion of the population is against the occupying forces. And that is particularly so if the occupying power, through the excessive use of force and degeneration into brutality and torture, loses its moral authority. If order and stability cannot be established and maintained, it is impossible to proceed to the next stages of nation-building. Yet if there is insufficient prospect of political, administrative, and economic reform, resistance to the occupying force grows yet stronger, making order and stability even harder to establish and maintain.

Kosovo, by contrast, has arguably been a success, even if so far only partial and (as events in March this year showed) still precarious. This success has been felt much more in the region as a whole than in Kosovo itself. The international community had an agreed vision of what it wanted to achieve; and the initial, multinational, mid-20s force ratio was sufficient to establish and maintain order and stability, through a functioning relationship between troops and the (newly established) police force. Political reform has permitted local elections to be held, and administrative and economic reform has made worthwhile progress. Significant international economic assistance has helped.

That said, the fundamental political problem remains unresolved, so that the international military presence is as necessary as ever. Hopes that international help with economic and political reform could, with the stability provided by international troops, make the political problem somehow less dominant or pressing, and thereby easier to resolve or

sidestep, have been disappointed. But at least **Kosovo** has not blown up, even if it appeared to come close in March this year, and the situation remains under control.

In **Afghanistan:**

- Troop numbers are too low to allow the government in Kabul to control the country effectively, enforce the rule of law, or provide basic security. Until it can do so, the kind of progress that the international community wants to see will be difficult to achieve.

- Unless the local warlords and criminal groups can be controlled, the government will be unable to stop the widespread cultivation of heroin poppies, which has increased dramatically since the defeat of the Taliban.

- If political change is to be sustained, more international military support will be needed than is currently available, with better resources.

- The security situation is critical if the planned election, postponed from June this year until September, is to provide the full democratic validation that the government in Kabul so badly needs.

- Significant multilateral help will be needed with the rebuilding of the economy, infrastructure and social, political and legal institutions.

Appendix 1: Costing The Peace[88]

The costs of the war in Iraq, and the peacekeeping which will follow, have important implications, both for budget deficits and for bond yields, in the US and beyond.

Increasingly, clients are asking us about the cost of the war in Iraq, including potential implications for the US budget deficit and bond yields. And the cost issue is evidently also on the mind of the US Senate that, by cutting in half (to $350bn) the President's $726bn tax-cut proposal, reflected its concern at the cost of the US simultaneously fighting a war and cutting taxes.

This cost issue is of quantitative significance. We read the consensus of the research literature as concluding that every sustained increase in the federal budget deficit of 1% of GDP causes US 10-year yields to be 50bp higher than they would have been otherwise. Our own research, for the G7 countries as an aggregate, and based on the period of the 1980s and 1990s, suggests a higher figure, of some 83bp for every percentage point of GDP increment to the central government budget deficit.

The shooting part of the war may cost around $75bn...

Obviously, it is impossible at this stage to cost the war accurately. We have been working with the assumption that the shooting part would cost around $75 billion. That accords quite closely with President Bush's proposal to Congress this week for a supplementary budget of $74.7bn to cover all costs from now to 30 September. The military component of that amounts to some $63bn.

The bigger, and more uncertain, question concerns the cost of keeping the peace. A Brookings Institution estimate, based on the NATO experience in Bosnia, is that peacekeeping costs around $200,000 per peacekeeping soldier per year. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) works with higher estimates, of around $250,000 per peacekeeping soldier per year. The key question, therefore, is how many peacekeeping soldiers will be needed, and for how long. Much will depend on how readily, once Baghdad and other major cities have been taken, the Iraqi population embraces the new situation.

Apparently, US planners are currently working on the assumption that the shooting part of the war lasts about a month; and that the airlift home will start in about four months' time. It could be however that larger numbers of peacekeeping soldiers will be needed, and for longer.

And a year's peacekeeping could cost $40bn....

Some British soldiers in Basra have been making comparisons with their experience in Northern Ireland – which, of course, already had a well-functioning police force. At its peak, in 1972 the British army had slightly over 25,500 troops in Northern Ireland, which has a population of 1.7 million. Scaling these troop numbers by the ratio of the population of Iraq (25 million) to that in Northern Ireland yields a figure of 375,000 peacekeeping troops. That is almost certainly too high a figure, being more appropriate for a largely urban environment. US military planners have reportedly confined themselves to an upper limit of 200,000. At a cost of $200,000 per soldier per year, that would imply an annual cost of some $40 billion, or nearly half of one percent of US GDP. Applying the interest rate rules of thumb above, this cost would add 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points to long-term interest rates.

Adding 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points to long-term bond yields

However, the US may not have to bear the whole of the cost. The 1991 Gulf War cost an estimated $81bn in today's prices, yet the net cost to the US was just $9bn. And were the UN to mount the peacekeeping operation, with the costs shared amongst all countries in their customary proportion, then the cost to the US could be only about one quarter of the total.

What is evident is that – unlike the war in the Balkans – the way in which the subsequent peacekeeping is organised and financed will be of central importance, to the US and its OECD trading partners alike.

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[88] *Reprinted from the "Global Letter" in the Global Weekly Economic Monitor, 28 March 2003.*

Appendix 2: The War In Algeria

The following are extracts from the extensive United States Library of Congress *Country Study on Algeria*.[89] The explanatory notes in square brackets have been added by the authors.

"In the early morning hours of All Saints' Day, November 1, 1954, FLN [National Liberation Front – Front de Libération Nationale] …*maquisards* (guerrillas) launched attacks in various parts of Algeria against military installations, police posts, warehouses, communications facilities, and public utilities. From Cairo, the FLN broadcast a proclamation calling on Muslims in Algeria to join in a national struggle for the 'restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam.' …. It was the reaction of Premier Pierre Mendès-France, who only a few months before had completed the liquidation of France's empire in Indochina, that set the tone of French policy for the next five years. On November 12, he declared in the National Assembly: 'One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably French … Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession.'" …

"An important watershed in the War of Independence was the massacre of civilians by the FLN near the town of Philippeville in August 1955. Before this operation FLN policy was to attack only military and government-related targets."…

"Governor General Robert Lacoste, a socialist, abolished the Algerian Assembly. Lacoste saw the assembly, which was dominated by colons [European colonialists], as hindering the work of the administration, and he undertook to rule Algeria by decree law. He favored stepping up French military operations and granted the army exceptional policy powers – a concession of dubious legality under French law – to deal with the mounting terrorism. At the same time, Lacoste proposed a new administrative structure that would give Algeria a degree of autonomy and a decentralized government." …

"Meanwhile, in October 1956 Lacoste had the FLN external political leaders who were in Algeria at the time arrested and imprisoned for the duration of the war. This action caused the remaining rebel leaders to harden their stance." …

"France took a more openly hostile view of President Nasser's [Gamal Abdul Nasser, President of Egypt from 1954-70] material and political assistance to the FLN, which some French analysts believed was the most important element in sustaining continued rebel activity in Algeria. This attitude was a factor in persuading France to participate in the November 1956 AngloSuez Campaign, meant to topple Nasser from power." …

"From its origins in 1954 as ragtag *maquisards* numbering in the hundreds and armed with a motley assortment of hunting rifles and discarded French, Germany, and United States light weapons, the ALN [the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale), the FLN's military arm] had evolved by 1957 into a disciplined fighting force of nearly 40,000. …. The brunt of the fighting was borne by … estimates … range from 6,000 to more than 25,000…"

"During 1956 and 1957, the ALN successfully applied hit-and-run tactics according to the classic canons of guerrilla warfare. Specializing in ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colon farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population in the countryside. Kidnapping was commonplace, as were the ritual murder and mutilation of captured French military, …."

"Although successful in engendering an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within both communities in Algeria, the revolutionaries' coercive tactics suggested that they had not as yet inspired the bulk of the Muslim people to revolt against French colonial rule.

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[89] *Library of Congress Country Studies (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/).*

Gradually, however, the FLN/ALN gained control in certain sectors …. But it was never able to hold large fixed positions." …

"To increase international and domestic French attention to their struggle, the FLN decided to bring the conflict to the cities and to call a nationwide general strike. The most notable manifestation of the new urban campaign was the Battle of Algiers, which began on September 30, 1956, when three women placed bombs at three sites including the downtown office of Air France. … the publicity given the brutal methods used by the army to win the Battle of Algiers, including the widespread use of torture, cast doubt in France about its role in Algeria."

"Despite complaints from the military command in Algiers, the French government was reluctant for many months to admit that the Algerian situation was out of control and that what was viewed officially as a pacification operation had developed into a major colonial war. By 1956 France had committed more than 400,000 troops to Algeria … France also sent air force and naval units to the Algerian theatre." …

"The French military command ruthlessly applied the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering, supplying, or in any way cooperating with the guerrillas. Villages that could not be reached by mobile units were subject to aerial bombardment. The French also initiated a program of concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in camps under military supervision to prevent them from aiding the rebels …. These population transfers apparently had little strategic effect on the outcome of the war, but the disruptive social and economic effects of this massive program continued to be felt a generation later."

"The French army shifted its tactics at the end of 1958 to the use of mobile forces deployed on massive search-and-destroy missions against ALN strongholds. Within the next year, … General Maurice Challe appeared to have suppressed major rebel resistance. But political developments had already overtaken the French army's successes." …

"Europeans as well as many Muslims greeted de Gaulle's return to power as the breakthrough needed to end of the hostilities." …

"De Gaulle immediately appointed a committee to draft a new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, which would be declared early the next year, with which Algeria would be associated but of which it would not form an integral part." …

"De Gaulle's initiative threatened the FLN with the prospect of losing the support of the growing numbers of Muslims who were tired of the war and had never been more than lukewarm in their commitment to a totally independent Algeria." …

"ALN commandos committed numerous acts of sabotage in France in August, and the FLN mounted a desperate campaign of terror in Algeria to intimate Muslims into boycotting the referendum. Despite threats of reprisal, however, 80 percent of the Muslim electorate turned out to vote in September, and of these 96 percent approved the constitution." …

"In 1958-59 the French army had won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. During that period in France, however, opposition to the conflict was growing among many segments of the population. … relatives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain; revelations of torture and the indiscriminate brutality the army visited on the Muslim population prompted widespread revulsion; … International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria independence … France's seeming intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half the manpower of its armed forces was also a source of concern to its North American Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. In a September 1959 statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand and uttered the words 'self-determination,' which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France." …

"Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colons, backed by units of the army, staged an insurrection in Algiers in January 1960 that won mass support in Europe." …

"Important elements of the French army … joined in another insurrection in April 1961. The leaders of this 'generals' putsch' intended to seize control of Algeria as well as topple

the de Gaulle regime. Units of the Foreign Legion offered prominent support, and the well-armed Secret Army Organization (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète – OAS) coordinated the participation of colon vigilantes." …

"The 'generals' putsch' marked the turning point in the official attitude toward the Algerian war. De Gaulle was now prepared to abandon the colons, the group that no previous French government could have written off. The army had been discredited by the putsch and kept a low profile politically throughout the rest of France's involvement with Algeria. … after several false starts the French government decreed that a cease-fire would take effect on March 19, 1962." …

"During the three months between the case-fire and the French referendum on Algeria, the OAS unleashed a new terrorist campaign." …

"On July 1, 1962, some 6 million of a total Algerian electorate of 6.5 million cast their ballots in the referendum on independence. The vote was nearly unanimous. De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country on July 3." …

"French military authorities listed their losses at nearly 18,000 dead … and 65,000 wounded. According to French figures, security forces killed 141,000 rebel combatants, and more than 12,000 Algerians died in internal FLN purges during the war. An additional 5,000 died in the 'café wars' in France between the FLN and rival Algerian groups. French sources also estimated that 70,000 Muslim civilians were killed, or abducted and presumed killed, by the FLN."

"Historian Alistair Horne considers that the actual figure of war dead is far higher than the original FLN and official French estimates, even if it does not reach the 1 million adopted by the Algerian government." …■

Appendix 3: Sources and Methods

Sources and Methods for Table 1: Peak Force Ratios In Major Stability And Control Operations

*Peak number of security forces***:**

Afghanistan: Gilmore, G. J., Afghanistan *Efforts Paying Off, DoD Official Tells House Committee*, (US Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service) *http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/n04292004_200404297.html*

Algeria: Library of Congress, *Country Studies: Algeria* http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/dztoc.html

Bosnia: Dobbins, J., et. al., *America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq,* p. 95 (RAND, 2003), and CIA, *FactBook: Bosnia Herzegovina* http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html

Cambodia: The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia deployed about 16,000 troops, and 3,600 international civilian police to supervise about 60,000 indigenous police. Source: Quinlivan, J. T., *Force requirements in Stability Operations*, Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995) http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm

Dominican Republic: Quinlivan states that the number of US soldiers and Marines totaled 24,000: Quinlivan, J. T., *Force requirements in Stability Operations*, Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995) http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm

East Timor: United Nations, *UN Peacekeeping*, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetBC.htm

Haiti: Dobbins, J., et. al., *America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq,* p. 75 (RAND, 2003).

Germany (American zone): See "Force ratios" below.

India, Punjab region: India deploys a security force of about 115,000 (regular troops, paramilitaries, and police) in the Punjab: Quinlivan, J. T., *Force requirements in Stability Operations*, Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995) http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm, which in turn cites an interview with Punjab's Director General of Police, Kanwar Pal Singh Gill in *Jane's Defence Weekly* p. 23 (23 January, 1993)

Iraq: US Department of Defense, *Paramilitaries and Police: Academy-trained Iraqi Police Service,* http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/images/040412-status.gif

Japan: See "Force ratios" below.

Kosovo: The initial Kosovo Peace Implementation Force numbered almost 45,000 troops. By December 2000 4,450 UNMIK international police were in the province. Dobbins, J., et. al., *America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq* pp. 115 and 119 (RAND, 2003)

Lebanon: Cedar South Lebanon" *http://www.veteranen.info/~cedarsouthlebanon/mnf/multinational_force.eng.htm*

Malaya: Quinlivan states that the British deployed close to 40,000 regular troops from Britain and the Commonwealth, as well as regulars from the Malay Regiment. If the Home Guard force of 210.000, 1953 strength, not all of whom were either armed or active at any given time, were added, the force ratio figure would be even higher. Quinlivan in turn cites Barber, N., *The War of the Running Dogs, The Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960* pp. 156-57 (Weybright and Talley, 1971). Quinlivan, J. T., *Force requirements in Stability Operations*, Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995) http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm

Northern Ireland: Peak deployment of British troops was 17,000, in 1972. The Ulster Defence Regiment numbered 8,700: *UK Army Headquarters in Northern Ireland: History.* http://www.army.mod.uk/aishqni/history/. The figure for the Royal Ulster Constabulary at that time, 3,500, is taken from the CAIN Web Service, which notes in "Security and Defense" that "Up until March 1970 the size of the RUC never exceeded 3,500 members, but this was reassessed in the light of 'the Troubles", and membership of the RUC stood at 8,489 when it was replaced by the PSNI" [in 2001]. The true figure is therefore probably a little above 3,500. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security.htm. Troop level in October 2003: Northern Ireland Office, *Responding to a changing security situation* (October, 2003) http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/respchang2003.pdf

Somalia: The December 1992 Unified Task Force (UNITAF) force in Somalia included 28,000 US troops: Dobbins, J., et. al., *America's Role in Nation-building: from Germany to Iraq,* p. 60 (RAND, 2003). The successor UN-led UNOSOM II force had an authorized strength of 28,000, but never numbered more than 16,000 (Dobbins et. al., p 59, op cit)

South Vietnam: Britannica, *Vietnam War* (1996)
http://www.search.eb.com/elections/micro/623/9.html

Population at time of peak security force numbers:

Afghanistan, 1994; Algeria, 1962; Bosnia, 1996; **Cambodia, 1992; Dominican Republic, 1965; East Timor**, **2000**; **Haiti, 1994; Lebanon, 1980; and Somalia, 1993; US** Census Bureau, *International data base*
 http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html

Germany, West, http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Europe/germanwc.htm, *based on statistics from "Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland."*

Japan: See "Force ratios," below.

India, Punjab region, 1995; Quinlivan, J. T., *Force requirements in Stability Operations*, Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995) http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm

Kosovo: 1999. University of Linz European Centre For Minority Issues (ECMI) http://www.ecmi.de/emap/download/KosovoStatisticsFinalOne.pdf

Malaya: Quinlivan, J. T., *Force requirements in Stability Operations*, Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995) http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm
Northern Ireland: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, mid-1975 estimate http://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/

South Vietnam: *Vietnam War*, Britannica (1996) http://www.search.eb.com/elections/micro/623/9.html

Force ratios

Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Somalia, and South Vietnam: Calculated from the security-force and population figures in the table.

Germany (American zone), India (Punjab region), Japan, and Malaya: Quinlivan, J. T., *Force requirements in Stability Operations*, Parameters, US War College Quarterly (Winter, 1995)
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm

Appendix 4: Land Area

Table 3.   **Land area**

	Area, sq km
Afghanistan	647,500
Algeria	2,381,740
Bosnia	51,129
Cambodia	181,040
Dominican Republic	48,730
East Timor	15,007
Haiti	27,750
India , Punjab	50,362
Japan	377,835
Kosovo	10,908
Lebanon	10,400
Malaya	329,750
Northern Ireland	14,160
Somalia	637,657
South Vietnam	171,716
West Germany	244,280

Sources:

Afghanistan, Algeria, **Cambodia**, **Dominican Republic**, **East Timor**, , **Haiti**, **Japan Lebanon**, **Malaya**, **Somalia**, *CIA FactBook*
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/

Bosnia,
http://www.geographyiq.com/countries/bk/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_geography.htm

India, Punjab: http://www.webindia123.com/punjab/land/land.htm

Kosovo: United States Agency for International development (USAID), *Profile of Kosovo*
http://www.usaid.gov/missions/kosovo/Kosovo_profile/Kosovo_profile.htm

Northern **Ireland**: *Whitaker's Almanack* (The Stationery Office, 1998)

South Vietnam: Newnes Family Reference Dictionary (1st edition, c. 1962)

West Germany:
http://www.theodora.com/wfb1989/germany_federal_republic_of/germany_federal_republic_of_geography.html

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